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This paper examines the history of Puerto

process of political incorporation of
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Rican efforts to win the mayoralty of the

minority elites. A modern polity cannot

city of New York, highlighting the 2005

be fully democratic if the door to political

election. By doing so, it seeks to fill a gap

power is permanently closed to any

in the history of Puerto Rican political

one group or segment of society.

participation in New York. The struggle

Therefore, for the sake of urban

of Puerto Rican elites to win representa-

democracy, we need to know whether

tion at the highest level of office in the

the Puerto Rican experience reflects

city is long-standing. The paper chronicles

structural or contingent difficulties.

by Richard Kendall

the circumstances and terms according to
which they sought political incorporation

Efforts to develop insights for the future

at that level.

from historical experience are not without

A full survey of the history of efforts by

same, solutions that worked in the past

political leaders to secure the nomination

may not work in the present. The solu-

and obtain the mayoralty would include a

tions we identify may be misleading if

detailed narrative and analysis of the role

the past is inaccurately represented. We

of party organizations, labor unions, commu-

can find lessons in history but we must

nity groups, and voter behavior over time.

be self-conscious about their limitations.

While this paper offers some references

History can be a guide for action so long

to the larger context in which Puerto Rican

as we recognize that before action historical

political elites carried out their efforts,

knowledge is rarely, if ever, tried and true.

such account is beyond its scope. The
paper looks critically at the issue of runoff
elections. The role of money is examined
through the lens of the 2005 election. The
results of the 2005 vote are also included.
The paper concludes with a reflection
on the prospects for Puerto Rican (Latino
or minority) political representation at
the mayoral level in New York.
The experience of Puerto Ricans in New

pitfalls.1 Because nothing remains the

Seeking the Nomination,
1969-2001
Puerto Ricans have been present in New
York City since the nineteenth century.
As early as 1937, the community obtained
political representation with the election
of Oscar García Rivera, of Manhattan, to
the state assembly. At the time, Puerto
Rican colonies were scattered throughout
the city and their numbers were not as

York deserves more detailed scrutiny. Their
case is interesting because it provides
insights that help us understand the
					

1 See José E. Cruz, “Pushing Left to Get to the Center, Puerto
Rican Radicalism in Hartford, Connecticut,” In Andrés Torres and
José E. Vélazquez, eds,. The Puerto Rican Movement, Voices from
the Diaspora (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), pp. 69-87.
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significant as during the post-World War II period. In 1953,

history of Puerto Rican efforts to control the mayor’s office

thirteen years after García Rivera’s stint in Albany ended, Felipe

began with the candidacy of Herman Badillo.

N. Torres was elected to the assembly; he served until 1962.
Badillo got his start in New York City politics as a stalwart of
Around the end of Torres’ incumbency, Puerto Ricans in New

the Kennedy campaign for the presidency. Through the John F.

York began to engage in a different style of political action.

Kennedy political club he became head of the campaign in East

The period from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was

Harlem in 1960. His involvement was prompted by the need to

marked by sporadic instances of collective behavior as well as

register Hispanics and blacks. When he approached the Italian

by a radical ferment. During this stage, Puerto Ricans were
protagonists of one of the worst civil disturbances the city had
ever seen and the first large-scale rebellion in their New York
history, the Harlem Riot of 1967. Activists also organized the
Young Lords Party (YLP), the Puerto Rican Socialist Party

leadership of the Democratic party with his registration proposal
they were simply shocked. According to Badillo, no one had
ever thought of registering blacks and Hispanics even though
they were at the time the predominant population in the Bronx.

(PSP), El Comité-MINP (Movimiento de Izquierda Nacional

As soon as Badillo began his registration work, he had to contend

Puertorriqueño), and the Puerto Rican Student Union (PRSU).

with the resistance of the party organization headed by Congress-

These groups tried, unsuccessfully, to bridge mainland and
homeland politics, using local issues to rally Puerto Ricans
behind the cause of independence for Puerto Rico. At the
same time, mainstream Puerto Rican politicians focused their
efforts on bureaucratic political incorporation, sidestepping
the national question. Nevertheless, they used national identity
to incite political participation locally. Puerto Rican leaders
were active in the Community Action Program (CAP) agencies
and anti-poverty programs of the time. They developed their
own anti-poverty agencies, participated in the social movements
of the time, and ran for office locally and statewide. During the
Wagner and Lindsay administrations a number of Puerto Rican
elites became influential as participants in electoral campaigns,
as advisors to the mayor, and through appointment or election
to positions of responsibility and power. Access to power
during that period was the prologue of interventions focused
on the mayoralty. In 1969, Puerto Rican Herman Badillo
sought the city’s mayoral office for the first time.

man Alfred Santangelo. “You can’t believe all the garbage that’s
being registered,” one of Santangelo’s workers told him, referring to Puerto Ricans and blacks. This worker did not know that
Badillo was Puerto Rican; he didn’t even know who Badillo
was, because Badillo could pass for Italian. So the worker said:
“We got to stop them. The school is supposed to close at
10:30 pm but I’m going to close it at 9:00 pm.” Badillo faked
agreement and then proceeded to plant himself in front of the
school at 9:00 pm to wait for voters to come to register. As they
turned away he took their names and then filed a lawsuit on
their behalf against the Board of Elections for discrimination.
He tried and won the lawsuit. This was “the first time in the
history of New York City that it was proven that the Board of
Elections and the regular [party] organization discriminated
against Hispanics and blacks.” According to Badillo, his registration effort and the lawsuit had two major consequences:
East Harlem had the largest increase in new registered voters
in the 1960 election and he became known politically.3

Strike One

In 1960, columnist Babby Quintero wrote: “New York is

In January 1969, during the course of an interview at City

becoming more and more Hispanic by the day but “El Barrio”

Hall, Badillo, then Bronx Borough president, was asked if he

has been dismembered. (…) There is no place in Manhattan,

planned to run for mayor. He offered a curious response:

the Bronx, and Brooklyn without Hispanic residents, the

“Many think that all Puerto Ricans are short, colored, and

majority being Puerto Rican. We fancy that a Puerto Rican

unable to speak English. If I run I will go everywhere in the

mayor is not that far off in the future.” Nine years later, the

city so that everyone can see that I am tall, proficient in

2 Babby Quintero, “En Nueva York y en Todas Partes, El Diario de Nueva York, November 2, 1960, p. 6.

3 Herman Badillo Interview, August 10, 2006 by José E. Cruz.
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English, a certified public accountant, and a lawyer.”4 Perhaps

Badillo ahead of Wagner by three points.7 Described by the

for the sake of prudence, he did not say that he also wanted

press as “the liberal Democratic president of the Bronx,”

people to see that he was white. The subtext was nevertheless

Badillo’s campaign focused on service delivery issues. So did

there, in the use of the word “colored”: he was a viable candi-

Wagner’s. Meanwhile, the conservative wing of the Republican

date because he was qualified and also because he could pass.

Party attacked Mayor John Lindsay for being soft on crime.
The call of conservatives for law and order was expected to

Badillo needed to win a party primary scheduled for June 17.

resonate among what they called “the Democratic Irish and

In a statement released at the Overseas Press Club on April 2,

Italians and others who don’t like Negro lovers.”8

he specified his qualifications and declared his intention to

By mid-July, Lindsay had enough support to secure his re-election

meet the fiscal, administrative, and political challenges facing
the city. His emphasis was on making the city livable. “Sure
New York is falling apart,” reads one of his campaign flyers,
“but Badillo can put it back together.” Badillo’s solution to the

bid and Badillo’s candidacy was over. In the primary Badillo received
almost 90 percent of the Puerto Rican vote, over half of the black
vote, and over 20 percent of the Jewish vote. But this was not
enough. Mario Procaccino won the Democratic nomination with

imbalance between annual increases in spending of 15 percent

less than a third of the ballots and Badillo lost, not so much

compared to annual revenue increases of only 4 percent was

because of Norman Mailer’s campaign, as he claimed in 2006,

simple: “We will have that deficit regardless of who is mayor

but because of the support that Wagner took away from him

and regardless of what promises are made unless income is

from Jewish voters.9 The multiple expressions of support for

increased or expenses are reduced.” Reacting to the climate of

Badillo, including a plea from Puerto Rico’s ex-governor Luis

racial and ethnic hostility that enveloped the city he declared:

Muñoz Marín for Puerto Ricans to register and vote for him,

“There has been an increase in crime and there are some who

did not translate into the votes needed to win.10 A voter registration

believe that the Blacks and the Puerto Ricans are the only

drive that was promised by Puerto Rican activist Gilberto Gerena

criminals...There are slums in this city and there are some who

Valentín—who had just been fired from his post on the Commis-

look at the people who live in them and blame them for their

sion on Human Rights—was actually led by H. Carl McCall

existence. The fact is that most of the slums in our city were

and Frank Espada. While over 60,000 new voters were added

created prior to 1900—before those groups who reside in them

to the rolls, the campaign was considered a failure. The large

now migrated to New York City.”5 Badillo continued to forge
ahead and in May, with Frank Espada, chairman of ASPIRA
and vice president of the Urban Coalition, he joined a group
of black leaders to form Black Independent Voters, to endorse
candidates and to unify the city’s black and Puerto Rican vote.6
As the mayoral primary neared, Badillo’s prospects became
dimmer. By June 12, Robert Wagner had a slight edge over

number of blacks and Puerto Ricans expected to register did not
materialize and there were charges of apathy, indifference, and
even subversion of the effort on the part of the political parties.
Blacks and Puerto Ricans were allegedly discouraged from registering by inspectors doing the bidding of local party leaders. As a
result, McCall and Espada called for the abolition of the Elections
Board and for the placing of federal supervisors in districts
where less than 50 percent of the voters were registered.11

him according to a poll conducted by the newspaper Town and
Village. Yet the cumulative results of two weeks of polling put

7 Lindsay, Wagner Win in Final Poll, June 12, 1969. John V. Lindsay Papers, Subject Files 19661973, Box 90 Folder 1676, Municipal Archives, New York City.
8 Law and Order is the Issue in New York City Campaign, June 12, 1969. John V. Lindsay Papers,
Subject Files 1966-1973, Box 90 Folder 1676, Municipal Archives, New York City.

4 “Herman Badillo Hará Campaña en la Calle,” El Diario-La Prensa, January 13, 1969, p. 13. In
1965, shortly after his election as Bronx Borough President, Badillo was asked if he intended to run for
mayor. His reply was: “People are also mentioning Lindsay’s name as a presidential candidate. I think
we are only interested in working hard during the next four years in our new posts.” See “Junta de
Elecciones Declara Ganador a Herman Badillo,” El Diario-La Prensa, November 9, 1965, p. 3.
5 Herman Badillo Primary Campaign Flyer; Statement of Bronx Borough President Herman Badillo
made at Overseas Press Club, April 2, 1969. Jesús Colón Papers, New York Organizations, Box
1, Folder 5. Center for Puerto Rican Studies Archives, Hunter College, City University of New York.
Hereinafter referred to as Centro Archives.
6 “Negro Unit Seeks Power Of Ballot,” New York Times, May 11, 1969, p. 37. In February, Frank
Espada was identified in a New York Times report as executive director of the Urban Coalition.

9 Chris McNickle, To be Mayor of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 226228. In the 2006 interview, Badillo referred to Norman Mailer’s candidacy for the mayoral nomination
as a “drunken campaign.” Badillo noted that he lost by less than the amount of votes accrued by
Mailer and inferred that those votes would have gone to him if Mailer had not participated.
10 Muñoz’s open letter in support of Badillo was published in Luisa Quintero’s “Marginalia” column in
El Diario-La Prensa, on June 9, 1969, p. 16.
11 “Badillo Rejects A Mayoral Race; May Back Lindsay,” New York Times, July 15, 1969, p. 1;
Richard Reeves, “Democratic Group Endorses Lindsay At Unruly Session,” New York Times, July
17, 1969, p. 1; “The Anti-Registration Drive,” New York Times, August 25, 1969, p. 34; Peter Kihss,
“Special Drive for Registration Fails to Draw Minority Voters,” New York Times, August 26, 1969, p. 33;
“Civic Body Scores Voter Drive Here,” New York Times, September 5, 1969, p. 35.
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Badillo’s aborted bid for the mayoralty was compounded by

tions. This was the result of Lopez v. Dinkins (1973), a lawsuit

the loss in the November election of his post as Bronx borough

filed by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund

president to Robert Abrams. On November 19, the Misión

(PRLDEF) with Community Action for Legal Services and

Vito Marcantonio of the Movimiento Pro Independencia, a

the New York Civil Liberties Union. In September, building

Puerto Rican nationalist group seeking to end colonialism in

upon the March decision, PRLDEF scored another victory

Puerto Rico, issued a public statement declaring that Puerto

when a federal district judge ruled on a suit filed by the group,

Ricans should be working in unity with blacks against oppor-

ordering the city’s elections board to provide bilingual voting

tunistic politicians and professionals such as Herman Badillo.

instructions and translators for the November election at all

“That rotten leadership,” reads the statement, “deserves only

polling places in districts where 5 percent or more of the resi-

our repudiation.”12 This appraisal is worth highlighting

dents spoke Spanish.15

because, at best, it suggests that one segment of the political
leadership of the community did nothing to help Badillo when

This was a condition favorable to Badillo but he was unable to

he needed all the support he could get.

take advantage of the provision. His inability to win the
endorsement of the NDC, of the regular party organization,

The climate of opinion in 1969 was also not favorable to

and later the primary against Abraham Beame was due to sev-

Badillo. Not only was racial polarization in the city intense

eral factors: a series of credentials challenges that eroded his

but, in addition, the Lindsay administration was perceived as

base of support, his failure to win over non-Puerto Ricans and

racially biased in favor of minorities. White New Yorkers did

conservatives, his public “spasm of rage” when things did not

not feel represented at City Hall.13 If they felt abandoned by a

go his way, and his rigidity and arrogance. Beame was strong

white mayor, what were the chances they would think that a

because in the eyes of voters he had the most governmental

Puerto Rican candidate would be any different? Further,

experience. He was also the favorite of the party regulars, who

minority voters felt adequately represented by Lindsay. In that

trusted him as one of their own. Badillo, in contrast, could not

case, there was no strong reason for them to support Badillo.

even get the support of the black elite. Percy Sutton, Charles
Rangel, and Basil Paterson felt the wind blowing in the direc-

Strike Two

The next time a Puerto Rican sought the Democratic Party’s
nomination for mayor was in 1973. Once again, the aspirant
was Herman Badillo. He faced Ed Koch, Robert Postel, a city
councilman, Jerome Kretchner, and assemblyman from the
Upper West Side, and Albert Blumenthal, also an assemblyman
and deputy minority leader of the State Assembly. The key to
the nomination was the endorsement of the liberal group, the
New Democratic Coalition (NDC). Badillo assumed he had it
and Blumenthal worked for it. Badillo lost the endorsement
and in a fit of rage accused the NDC of racism.

14

This time, a critical element of the context was the court mandate, issued on March 22, ordering the use of bilingual ballots
and interpreters at the polls in community school board elec-

tion of Beame and with him they went.16
Badillo’s ethnicity was also considered a factor of his defeat.17
Yet, if ethnicity was an obstacle, what could explain the election of Ramón Vélez from the Bronx’s 11th district, and Luis
Olmedo from Brooklyn’s 27th to the city council? The answer
was simple: in districts configured with large Puerto Rican
concentrations, Puerto Ricans won. Citywide, partisan politics,
legal requirements, personality features, and racial polarization
combined to make success impossible.18 But racial polarization
was part of the context rather than a decisive factor. Badillo
acted arrogantly and brashly; the rejection by voters of Mario
15 Murray Illson, “Judge Orders City to Run Bilingual Elections Nov. 6,” New York Times, September
28, 1973, p. 1.
16 McNickle, pp. 245-246.

12 Movimiento Pro Independencia, Misión Vito Marcantonio, Declaración de Prensa, November 19,
1969. Jesús Colón Papers, New York Organizations, Box 1, Folder 4. Centro Archives. Citation translated from the Spanish by José E. Cruz.
13 McNickle, pp. 216-218.
14 Ibid., pp. 243-244.

17 Frank Lynn, “Blumenthal Tops Badillo For Coalition’s Backing,” New York Times, March 4, 1973,
p. 1; Frank Lynn, “Badillo Urged by Abrams To Give Up Mayoral Race,” New York Times, March 6,
1973, p. 33; Frank Lynn, “He’s Out; Who’s In?” New York Times, March 11, 1973, section 4, p. 1;
Tomn Buckley, “Badillo: Mayoral Hopeful Dogged by Problems,” New York Times, April 2, 1973, p. 37;
Frank Lynn, “A Minority Candidacy Is Rejected,” New York Times, July 1, 1973, section 4, p. 3.
18 Murray Schumach, “Council Creates 6 Districts for City Groups,” New York Times, December 23,
1972, p. 1.
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Procaccino in favor of Lindsay in 1969 demonstrated that

black elected officials from across the country rallied behind

arrogance and vitriol was unacceptable regardless of ethnicity.

Percy Sutton. In August, sociologist Herbert Gans declared

Further, Badillo was weak citywide, not so much because he

Badillo the most competent candidate of all. WCBS-Radio

was Puerto Rican but because he was perceived to be, truly or

endorsed Badillo but WCBS-TV endorsed Mario Cuomo,

not, simply a Puerto Rican/minority candidate. To be sure,

who had entered the race as Governor Carey’s preferred

both the New York Times and the New York Post endorsed

candidate. Badillo was also given a “preferred” rating by the

Badillo as the best hope for the city as a whole. At the same

New York Political Action Council, a newly formed, nonpartisan

time, Italian and Irish voters were disinclined to support him

organization of gays and lesbians. A key challenge for Badillo

because he was Puerto Rican. But Badillo could have won if

was persuading voters that he was concerned with the interests

only he had persuaded a sufficient number of Jewish voters

of all New Yorkers rather than just Puerto Ricans. But in this

that he was a better choice than Beame. Beame was the party

he was not alone. The race as a whole was perceived as an ethnic

regular and Badillo was not and party support was critical in

contest between Italians, represented by Cuomo, blacks,

the mobilization of voters. Racism was present during the

represented by Sutton, and Jews, represented by Abzug, Koch,

campaign but it did not determine the outcome.20

and Beame. There was even a candidate that was considered

19

Strike Three

Badillo tried to win the nomination for mayor a third time in

representative of the business class, Joel Harnett, but he was
really nobody’s candidate.21

1977. In February he was only considering a run. Bella Abzug

Badillo came in sixth place in the primary with just 11 percent

and Edward Koch were also thinking about seeking the

of the vote. Koch and Cuomo came in first and second respec-

mayoralty. In March, the Democratic National Committee

tively and had to fight for the nomination in a runoff.22 Badillo

discounted the possibility of either Badillo or Koch being

decided to support Koch. Koch went on to win the nomination

successful. The committee declared that incumbent Abraham
Beame had the best chance of winning a primary. By April, the
scuttlebutt on Badillo was that without an endorsement from

and then the election, with more support from blacks and Puerto
Ricans than Cuomo, who ran on the Liberal Party line.23

the Liberal Party he would not run. Koch described him as far

Strike Four?

behind the pack. In May, Badillo saw his chances diminished

When Koch ran for re-election in 1981, there was a challenger

by the entrance into the race of Abzug. He blasted her in

from the Hispanic community but his candidacy was so

public for not honoring a promise to back him. According to

marginal that anyone other than a historian looking backward

Badillo, Abzug had offered her support in exchange for his

could easily miss it. It was not Herman Badillo, although he

endorsement of her U.S. senate candidacy in 1976. Against all

did consider running. In 1978, Koch made Badillo a Deputy

odds, in June he decided to enter the primary. He felt confident

Mayor and by 1979 Badillo was out. Now he was down and

in his ability to defeat Beame in a runoff.

out and therefore did not pursue the position. The challenger

At the same time, Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton
began campaigning for the Democratic nomination, with
support from black leaders David Dinkins and Charles
Rangel. This was a move that could only diminish black
support for Badillo. Badillo was certain that support for him
among blacks would erode only in Manhattan. This belief was
shattered when more than a dozen black mayors as well as

was Dr. Jerónimo Domínguez, who also ran for Bronx
borough president in 1979 on the Right to Life Party line.
During a debate with Koch he told the audience: “Everyone
must vote. If you don’t vote you cannot complain.” He
promised to end crime and drug abuse, to rebuild the
subway system, to maintain the city’s infrastructure, and to
rehabilitate the more than 10,000 buildings that had been
21 Ibid., pp. 260-261.

19 McNickle, p. 247.

22 Ibid., p. 267.

20 Ibid., pp. 250-252.

23 Ibid., p. 269.
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abandoned during the four years of Koch’s administration.

of Badillo was a severe blow to his candidacy, an emblem of

Domínguez also ran on a platform of higher taxes for the rich

Badillo’s weak standing with African-American elites.29

and the promise of a crackdown on absentee landlords. “If you
are rich or a landlord, then vote for Koch,” said Domínguez,
“because I am declaring war on rich people.”24 Councilman
Luis Olmedo, who was neither rich nor a landlord, exhorted
all Hispanics to re-elect Koch. In his view, Koch had done a
great job. Olmedo disputed the notion that Koch was hostile
to minorities in the city. Further, Olmedo claimed that Koch’s
victory was inevitable and that voting for someone else would
be a wasted vote.25 Koch won by a landslide, running on the

A week after Hill’s statement, the New York Times published
the results of a poll of 1,329 adults conducted between January
5 and 10. A majority of repondents, 53 percent, thought that
Koch deserved re-election. Among whites, support for Koch’s
re-election was 65 percent. Only 31 percent of blacks supported
his re-election compared to 49 percent of Hispanics. Support
for Badillo was only 34 percent. He was viewed most favorably
by Hispanics, but even among them only a minority of 45

Democratic and Republican party line.

percent had a favorable view of his candidacy; only 33 percent
of blacks shared the feeling.30 Poll results notwithstanding,

La Tercera (No) Es La Vencida

black leaders invited Badillo to be interviewed as a potential

(Three Strikes and You’re [Not] Out)

candidate at a meeting to be held on January 26. According to

In 1984, Latinos were starkly divided in their attitude toward

Assemblyman Al Vann, a group of black leaders, union officials,

Koch. Those opposing him were 54 percent of the total com-

and liberal Democrats would interview up to eight candidates

pared to 46 percent who were supportive. According to a

and then announce an endorsement.31

26

1984 poll, had Herman Badillo run against Koch in that year,
he would have lost the Latino vote 38 to 46 percent.27 The

Despite the Spanish saying and the evidence from the polls, if

rejection of Badillo by Latinos suggested that, in his case, as

Badillo ever had a good chance of securing the Democratic

the Spanish saying goes, “La tercera es la vencida” [Three strikes

nomination for mayor, it was in 1985. A coalition of Hispanic

and you’re out]. In Hispanic culture, just as in baseball, you

leaders supported his candidacy. At the end of January, after the

have three chances to make it; after that you are done. But in

Coalition for A Just New York completed the process of inter-

American politics, one failed candidacy is often enough to finish

viewing candidates, he and Carol Bellamy appeared to be the two

a politician’s career for good. By running for a fourth time,

hopefuls with the strongest support among black politicians.32

Badillo went against the conventional wisdom and then some.

Yet, after heated deliberations within the Coalition, support

In January 1985, Badillo declared that he would run for the

endorsed Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Jr. True to

mayoralty. He made his participation conditional on garnering

his word that he would not run without coalition support,

support from a broad-based coalition. His announcement

Badillo dropped out. “I can understand there will be disap-

was immediately followed by a blanket rejection from Stanley

pointment by those who expected that Mr. Badillo would be

Hill, deputy executive director of District Council 37 of the

our candidate,” Al Vann said.33 Indeed, Farrell’s last-minute

State, County, and Municipal Employees Union. District 37

entry into the race caused widespread resentment among

was key to developing an anti-Koch coalition, and Hill’s rejection

Hispanics. The unhappiness of Hispanic Democrats was so

24 “Si usted no vota luego no se queje, dice Domínguez,” El Diario-La Prensa, November 2, 1981,
p. 7. It is not certain that Domínguez was Puerto Rican.

29 Frank Lynn, “Koch Foes Discussing Blacks for Council President,” New York Times, January 12,
1985, p. 25.

25 Manuel de Dios Unanue, “Concejal Olmedo: que todos voten mañana,” El Diario-La Prensa,
November 2, 1981, p. 7.

30 “Poll Favors Koch for 3d Term but City Services Rate Poorly,” New York Times, January 17, 1985,
p. 1.

26 New York City Chapter’s Approach to Electoral Question, n.d., p. 2. Lourdes Torres Papers,
Series IV National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Box 4 Folder 4, Centro Archives.

31 Frank Lynn, “Koch Agrees to Meeting With Blacks at City Hall,” New York Times, January 18,
1985, p. B4.

27 Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, “The 1985 Mayoral Race and the Puerto Rican-Latino
Community in New York City,” December 1984, p. 4. Lourdes Torres Papers, Series IV National
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Box 4 Folder 4, Centro Archives.

32 Frank Lynn, “6 Mayoral Contenders Give Views to Black Group,” New York Times, January 27,
1985, p. 18; Susan Heller Anderson and David W. Dunlap, “New York Day by Day; Coalition Time,”
New York Times, January 30, 1985, p. B5.

28 Susan Heller Anderson and David W. Dunlap, “Who Will Finally Decide to Run Against Mayor
Koch?,” New York Times, January 5, 1985, p. 24.

33 Frank Lynn, “Bellamy Enters Race for Mayor; Black Coalition Endorses Farrell,” New York Times,
February 9, 1985, p. 1.

28

for Badillo was split. Under such circumstances, the Coalition
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great that some even demanded the dissolution of the Black and

Republican Victor Tosi. Méndez stayed in the race on the

Puerto Rican Caucus in Albany.34 On November 5, Koch was

New Alliance Party line, to no avail.38 Ferrer served for 14

reelected to serve a third term with over 80 percent of the vote.

years as borough president.

Next Man at Bat

To Ferrer, the symbolic power of Badillo’s 1969 run for the

After the 1985 debacle, Badillo’s successor in Congress, Robert

mayoralty was tremendous, a source of inspiration for his own

García, considered running for mayor. His plan to run focus

efforts.39 Yet, his 1997 campaign was a brief and feeble attempt

groups to gauge the willingness of nonHispanics to vote for a

that ended with him dropping out of the race to seek re-election

Puerto Rican was thwarted by the explosion of the Wedtech

of the borough presidency.40 On May 13, he declared: “A

scandal, a case of corruption, extortion, and bribery involving

paramount part of my decision is the belief that we as

federal funds, which terminated his political career. Thus, no

Democrats must promote a stronger sense of purpose in order

Puerto Rican pursued the mayor’s office until 1997 when

to defeat the Republican agenda of Rudolph Giuliani . . . I

Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer stepped up to the

believe in the Democratic Party. It is for that reason, and after

mayoral plate for the first time. Ferrer began his involvement

much deliberation, that I am taking the first step to unify

in politics as a student activist. His Wikipedia biography notes

behind one Democratic candidate, Ruth Messinger.”41

35

that “in 1968, as an Aspirante, he was part of a major student
protest at the NYC Board of Education that resulted in such

Puerto Ricans were not happy with this turn of events. The

reforms as bilingual report cards and the recognition by the

excitement over Ferrer’s candidacy was so high that it prompted

public schools of Puerto Rican Discovery Day (November

some to do what they had never done before: contribute money

19th).”36 It should be no surprise to anyone that the impact of

to the campaign. To many, his exit was a blow to what they

this demonstration, whose specific demands were more courses

considered the best opportunity to finally put a Puerto Rican in

on Puerto Rican culture and history and proportional repre-

the city’s highest office.42 In addition, his withdrawal may have

sentation of Puerto Ricans in the Board’s decentralization

prevented the election for the first time of a Puerto Rican woman

plan,37 is greatly exaggerated in the Wikipedia profile. Be that

to the Bronx borough presidency. This was the hope of Shirley

as it may, the event marked the early political activism of Ferrer.

Remeneski but her aspiration was dashed by Ferrer’s decision. She
considered herself a long shot because the party was not behind

Ferrer entered politics as a candidate for office in 1974 by

her but she never had a chance to confirm that guess.43 Once

running against Assemblyman Luis Nine, the incumbent in

Ferrer was out, the Democratic Party endorsed Ruth Messinger.

district 78 in the Bronx since 1970. His life as a public official

She went on to lose to incumbent Rudy Giuliani by over 200,000

began the following year. He occupied staff posts until his

votes. Giuliani obtained 757,564 votes or 57 percent of the total

election to the city council in 1982, to represent the Bronx’s

to Messinger’s 540,075, or 41 percent. Interestingly, even though

district 13. He was appointed Bronx borough president in

Giuliani’s support was mostly from white voters, he managed

1987, after the incumbent, Stanley Simon, was sent to prison

to make inroads into black and Latino constituencies.44 His

for his involvement in a municipal scandal that rocked the
Democratic Party. In September, he defeated Rafael Méndez
on a primary and was elected in November to complete

38 Frank Lynn, “Ferrer Seen as Choice in the Bronx,” New York Times, April 11, 1987;
Josué R. Rivas and Sandra Rodríguez, “Eligirán hoy al próximo presidente de El Bronx,” El Diario-La
Prensa, November 3, 1987, p. 2.

Simon’s term. During the general election, he defeated

39 Video interview with Fernando Ferrer, c. 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics
con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC, Centro Archives.
40 Jonathan P. Hicks, “Primary Races Expose Cracks in Once Unified Bronx Democratic Machine,”
New York Times, September 22, 1997, p. B3.

34 Frank Lynn, “Divided Opposition,” New York Times, February 16, 1985, p. 27.

41 “In His Own Words,” New York Times, May 14, 1997, p. B5.

35 Video interview with Robert García, June 19, 2004, used for the production of documentary
Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives. For a full and vivid account of the
Wedtech scandal see William Sternberg and Matthew C. Harrison, Feeding Frenzy: The Inside Story of
Wedtech (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1989).

42 Jonathan P. Hicks, “If His Party Was Unsurprised by Ferrer’s Move, Some Voters Are Crestfallen,”
New York Times, May 14, 1997, p. B5.

36 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernando_Ferrer <accessed June 9, 2008>.
37 See “Demonstración Ante la Junta de Instrucción,” Photo by Nury Hernández, El Diario-La
Prensa, November 20, 1968, p. 1.

43 Video interview with Shirley Remeneski, 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics
Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
44 Marjorie Connelly, “A Portrait of New York City Voters,” New York Times, November 9, 1997, p.
21; Adam Nagourney, “The 1997 Elections: The Parties; Evolving From Ideology Toward Pragmatism,”
New York Times, November 6, 1997, p. B3.
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advantage of 16 percentage points over Messinger was 14

say, the city was safer, fiscally stable, and enjoying economic

points greater than his margin over David Dinkins in 1993.

growth.47 On January 18, he went to the Canaan Baptist

In 2001, Ferrer tried his luck for the second time. Badillo
came back briefly for the fifth time, seeking the nomination

Church of Christ in Harlem to address a largely AfricanAmerican crowd on the commemoration of Martin Luther
King’s birthday. There, Al Sharpton stung him by saying that

against Michael Bloomberg on the Republican line. At this

it was not enough to quote King nor to remember him only

point he was dubbed the perennial candidate. Like Badillo in

once a year. Bloomberg took it all in stride and when it was

1973, Ferrer was not able to make it past the primary. His

his turn to speak was given a hearty reception by the audience.48

demise came in the runoff election against Public Advocate
Mark Green. The contest between Ferrer and Green was nasty

Meanwhile, the Democratic contest for the nomination began

and bitter. Ferrer was accused of being racially and ethnically

with revelations that Gifford Miller, the city council speaker,

divisive. Green was accused of engaging in racist tactics. In the

was planning a smear campaign against Fernando Ferrer and

end, Democrats confronted newcomer candidate Mike Bloomberg

Anthony Weiner. His plan included ignoring the black candi-

weak and divided. Green lost to Bloomberg narrowly, in large

dates Charles Barron, a city councilman from Brooklyn, and

part due to the decision by many Latino voters to either sit

C. Virginia Fields, the Manhattan borough president. Weiner

out the election or vote for the Republican candidate. The

was combative in his reaction, declaring himself ready for a

example of Raul Amador, a 61-year-old accountant from

fight. Ferrer’s camp put itself above the fray. “Fernando Ferrer

Queens is emblematic of this behavior. “If it wasn’t going to

is not concerned by or focused on other candidates’ strategies

be Ferrer, then, frankly, it didn’t matter that much who among

or what they may say about him,” said Ferrer’s campaign

these two Americans won,” he said. “Ferrer was one of us. The

spokeswoman, Jen Bluestein. “Mr. Ferrer is completely

other two are about the same.” Nevertheless, had he voted, he

focused on providing an alternative vision for New York City,

added, he would have chosen Bloomberg.45

and providing real leadership to address the affordability crisis

The 2005 Election

after-school programs for their kids, health care.”49

The clarion call of the 2005 campaign, sounded by the New
York Times, was negative for Mayor Bloomberg. According to
the Times, his challenge was to persuade New Yorkers that he
deserved another chance to steer the city through the combined
problems of a multibillion-dollar budget shortfall, disgruntled
teachers, firefighters, and police officers waiting to get contracts,
a financial crisis in public transportation and in public hospitals,
a critically short supply of affordable housing, increasing
numbers of homeless people, and a dearth of teachers and
classroom space in the public school system.46 For his part,
Bloomberg fired his own first shot of the campaign right in
the heart of enemy territory. At Hostos Community College

New York’s families are facing: finding affordable housing,

Above the fray or not, New Yorkers were not persuaded that
Ferrer was the best candidate. According to the results of a
poll conducted by Quinnipiac University, released in January
20, both Ferrer and Bloomberg enjoyed almost equal support
from likely voters. This was not good for Ferrer. Since
February of 2004 he had held an advantage over Bloomberg
of between four to seven percentage points.50 Now Bloomberg
was making inroads among minority voters with his numbers
rising 4 percentage points among blacks and 2 points among
Hispanics. Also, 50 percent of voters gave him a favorable job
rating compared to only 31 percent doing so in July 2003.51

in the Bronx he touted his record, recalling that in 2001 he
was presiding over a city full of doubts about its ability to

47 Tatsha Robertson, “Mayor Fights Own Image In N.Y. Race,” The Boston Globe, April 11, 2005,
p. A1.

overcome the effects of September 11. Now, he was proud to

48 Michael Slackman, “A Day for Dr. King, Sharpton and Politics,” New York Times, January 18,
2005, p. B3.
49 Winnie Hu, “Sparring Begins Among Democrats for Mayor,” New York Times, January 13, 2005,
p. B1

45 Mirta Ojito, “The 2001 Elections: The Voters; City’s Hispanics Shift, Moving Toward G.O.P.,” The
New York Times, November 8, 2001, p. 5.

50 Jim Rutenberg, “Metro Briefing New York: Manhattan: Bloomberg Catches Ferrer,” New York
Times, January 20, 2005, p. B8.

46

51 David Saltonstall, “Bloomy On Up & Up In Poll,” Daily News, January 20, 2005, p. 19.

“A Wish for a Campaign Promise,” New York Times, January 2, 2005, Section 14, p. 9.
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This was remarkable given efforts by his rivals to portray him
as a billionaire who was out of touch with the concerns of
poor New Yorkers and more interested in catering to powerful
corporate figures. Perhaps what was important to voters was
the mayor’s unwavering attitude. Even though a majority was
cool to the idea of building a new stadium on the west side of
Manhattan, they could still see favorable leadership qualities in
the incumbent. After all, it was hard to reject the possibility
that the future might prove the mayor right. As he put it himself: “When people look back 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from
now, they’ll say, ‘Thank God New Yorkers had the courage in
tough times to go ahead and not listen to the naysayers, but to
do the great things.’”52

Doris Ling-Cohan’s decision to make gay marriage legal in
New York. The Rev. Rubén Díaz Sr., a state senator from the
Bronx, said that such support was the equivalent of “slapping
us in our faces,” and warned Ferrer to be careful if he wanted
support from Latinos. “We can tell our people throughout the
Hispanic community and churches, don’t vote, stay home,”
said Díaz. Another evangelical leader from the Bronx, Rev.
Fernando Rodríguez, head of the Latin American Chaplain
Association, said that “We’re closing our churches down for
him to even visit.” Ferrer responded: “I’m consistent about
not liking discrimination, and so when you’re faced with
something like this, you have to act in the way that your heart
tells you.”56

At the end of January, Ferrer suffered a blow from within.
Bloomberg’s Republican rival in 2001, Herman Badillo, announced
his endorsement of the mayor. The mayor “is doing fine,’’ said
Badillo to the New York Times. “Crime overall has gone down.
He has a housing program. He did a good job of cleaning the
streets in the last snowfall. He’s created jobs. Overall, his
performance is very good, but more important is his work on
education.”53 Badillo’s standing among Latino voters was insignificant but his gesture was symbolically powerful. To Ferrer,
more challenging than Badillo’s endorsement of Bloomberg
was the candidacy of C. Virginia Fields, which posed a dilemma
for black leaders. It also raised the possibility of fostering
debilitating racial divisions and conflict among Democrats.

In March, New Yorkers were reminded of a remarkable fact:

In February, Ferrer was reportedly seeking to broaden his base
of support, picking up endorsements from Democratic politicians
who had backed Mark Green in 2001 and “talking extensively
about the middle class.”54 Key support came in mid-month
from the Village Independent Democrats, a group whose chosen
candidate had won the Democratic nomination consistently in
the four previous mayoral campaigns. His endorsement by
Eliot Spitzer was also seen as key in the mobilization of white
voters.55 At the same time, a minor insurrection took place
within Ferrer’s camp when he expressed support for Judge
52 Jim Rutenberg, “Stadium Push by Bloomberg May Come at His Political Peril,” New York Times,
January 23, 2005, p. 29.
53 Michael Slackman and Jim Rutenberg, “Mayor Gets Big Boost From Elders Of His Party,” New
York Times, January 27, 2005, p. B4.
54 Maggie Haberman, “Ferrer Gets Early Votes From Two Key State Pols,” Daily News, February 2,
2005, p. 22.
55 “Spitzer’s man,” Financial Times, February 25, 2005, p. 12.

“The percentage of black New Yorkers who have
voted for the Republican mayoral candidate has
increased fivefold since Rudolph W. Giuliani defeated
Mr. Dinkins in 1993. Mr. Giuliani took only 5 percent
of the black vote that year. That percentage grew to
20 percent for Mr. Giuliani in 1997. Mr. Bloomberg
took 25 percent of the black vote in 2001 against
Mark Green. Last time around, Mr. Bloomberg won
with 47 percent of the Hispanic vote, clearly benefiting from a racially divisive primary between Mr.
Ferrer and Mr. Green that left many Hispanic voters
alienated when Mr. Green won a runoff election.”57
No wonder that Bloomberg put a great a deal of effort in
reaching out to minority voters—going to Hostos
Community College and Canaan Baptist Church in January as
well as ceremonies commemorating the death of Malcolm X
and the achievements of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., among
other events targeting blacks and Latinos.
The one issue where the mayor could not get a firm footing
on was his proposal to build the west side stadium. In March,
a Quinnipiac University poll found that most respondents did
not think the mayor cared about them. Ferrer was seen as
56 Jim Rutenberg, “No Less Than Bloomberg, His Opponents Face a Test Over Stands on Gay
Marriage,” New York Times, February 13, 2005, p. 39.
57 Jim Rutenberg, “Bloomberg Works to Keep Blacks Switching to the G.O.P.,” New York Times,
March 2, 2005, p. B1.
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more sensitive to their problems and needs and 47 percent
supported him compared to 39 percent for Bloomberg.
Bloomberg was firm in his position. “I’m 63 years old and I’m
not going to spend my life pandering to anybody,” he declared.
“I’m going to do what I think is right for this city and I’m
going to lead from the front and not the back.”58 At that point
Ferrer was favored 61 to 23 percent by blacks and 65 to 27
percent by Latinos. Bloomberg had the white vote 53 to 32
percent.59 The question that kept surfacing about Ferrer was
“Can he move beyond a minority coalition and attract white
voters suspicious of a candidate who views the city as divided
into two New Yorks? And can he shake off the sense that he is
the product of a Bronx Democratic machine that has long been
tainted by accusations of favoritism and even corruption?”60
Then Amadou Diallo came storming in.61 At a meeting with
members of the Sergeants Benevolent Association on Tuesday,
March 15, Ferrer declared he did not believe the shooting of
Diallo had been a crime. Further, he claimed that those
responsible had been over-indicted. These statements were
shocking to many, especially since Ferrer had protested the
killing vehemently in 1999 and had called for a criminal trial.
Charges of flip-flopping and pandering followed immediately
in what the New York Times described as a political firestorm.62 A
poll taken after Ferrer made his remarks showed 37 percent of
924 registered voters interviewed saying they would be less
likely to vote for him because of his comments. But Ferrer
stayed ahead of the mayor 49 to 35 percent.63 Two major
African-American public figures, Congressmen Major R.
Owens and Edolphus Towns, endorsed Ferrer a week after the
remarks were made. Puerto Rican Congresswoman Nydia
Velázquez joined them, and all three tried to deflect attention
from the Diallo issue by emphasizing Ferrer’s record of

accomplishments on socioeconomic issues and his progressive
stance on racial relations.64 This came at the same time that Al
Sharpton decided to back Bloomberg’s west side stadium project
and Congressman Charles Rangel announced his endorsement
of C. Virginia Fields. These announcements were seen as cracks
in the black-Latino coalition that Ferrer needed to win.65
In April, Ferrer’s fortunes began to change dramatically. He
was described as a blubbering candidate who had begun to show
signs of weakness in adversity. At a private meeting, former
Mayor Ed Koch claimed that [Ferrer] had “slit his own throat”
with the Diallo remarks.66 According to Michael Goodwin, a
reporter for the Daily News, it was “business as usual. The
wanna-bes are running on platforms with just two planks: ethnic
and racial appeal, or platitudes suggesting Abe Lincoln was
wrong—you really can fool all the people all the time.”67 Also
in April, public speculation on the reasons for Al Sharpton’s
and Charles Rangel’s open support of Bloomberg’s stadium
proposal, Sharpton’s coy attitude towards Ferrer, and Rangel’s
endorsement of C. Virginia Fields suggested that black leaders
wanted Bloomberg to win. The rationale behind this was that
a Bloomberg victory would allow their preferred candidate,
Comptroller William “Bill” Thompson, to run in 2009 against
a white candidate as opposed to a Latino incumbent. “Blacks
and Hispanics have formed coalitions,” wrote Joyce Purnick,
“but black-Hispanic rivalries are strong, too. Do black political
leaders want to risk an eight-year run by a Mayor Ferrer, or
would they rather have another four years with a grateful Mr.
Bloomberg to clear the way for Mr. Thompson?”68 From the
Sharpton camp the answer to the question was that to have
such a plan was not only unnecessary but ridiculous.69
Ferrer continued to poll ahead of Bloomberg but his margin

58 Winnie Hu and Charles V. Bagli, “Obstacle Rises for Bloomberg On West Side Stadium Plan,”
New York Times, March 3, 2005, p. B1.

slipped from 14 to 6 percentage points, largely as a result of

59 David Saltonstall, “Freddy Leading Mike Poll has Ferrer Ahead of Mayor by 8 Points,” Daily News,
March 3, 2005, p. 4.
60 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Promoting Mayoralty as a National Democratic Goal,” New York Times,
March 10, 2005, p. B1.

64 Diane Cardwell, “Three in Congress Back Ferrer In Aftermath of Diallo Remark,” New York Times,
March 24, 2005, p. B4.

61 On February 4, 1999, Diallo, a 22-year-old Guinean immigrant, was shot at 41 times by New
York City police officers who were searching his Soundview neighborhood for a rapist. His body was
hit by 19 bullets, killing him instantly. See Ginger Thompson with Garry Pierre-Pierre, “Portrait of Slain
Immigrant: Big Dreams and a Big Heart,” New York Times, February 12, 1999, p.1; Leslie Casimir, Bill
Egbert, and Bill Hutchinson with Maureen Fan, “Throngs Say Farewell ‘Justice’ For Amadou is the Cry
in Procession From Harlem,” Daily News, February 15, 1999, p. 7.

65 Jim Rutenberg, “Lions, Lambs, Elephants, Donkeys and City Hall,” New York Times, March 30,
2005, p. B1; Randal C. Archibold, “Rangel Backs Fields in Race To Challenge Bloomberg,” New York
Times, April 1, 2005, p. B3.

62 Diane Cardwell, “For Ferrer and the Police, A Shifting Relationship,” New York Times, March 18,
2005, p. B3.
63 Jim Rutenberg, “Two Polls Show Ferrer Leading In a Race Against Bloomberg,” New York Times,
March 22, 2005, p. B7.

66 Patrick D. Healy, “Strategists’ Advice to Bloomberg? Show You’re No Born Billionaire,” New York
Times, April 8, 2005, p. A1.
67 Michael Goodwin, “Four Blind Mice On The Mayoralty,” Daily News, April 6, 2005, p. 43.
68

Joyce Purnick, “Foraging For the Truth In City Politics,” New York Times, April 11, 2005, p. B1.

69 Diane Cardwell, “Sharpton Backs No Candidate In the Primary,” New York Times, April 21, 2005,
p. B1.
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the Diallo remarks.70 On April 11, in a forum at the Lesbian,

proposal was also called an “economy killer” but it could have

Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community Center, in the

been called a candidate killer just as well. This was, in the

West Village, he was booed and hissed by the same people

short span of a month, the second major self-inflicted wound

who had been cheering him before his statement. “What

of the Ferrer campaign. Immediately after the fiasco, Al

about Diallo,” shouted two members of the audience as Ferrer

Sharpton announced that he would not be supporting anyone

spoke. “Why did you say what you said?” screamed another.

in the Democratic primary.76

Visibly upset, Ferrer sat down and remained silent. “I think
Freddy Ferrer is in real trouble, and I don’t know if he even
realizes how much,” said Percy Sutton while also wondering if
the Democrats could beat Bloomberg.71 On April 14, journalist
Juan González came to Ferrer’s aid with a tortured defense of
his “consistency” on the Diallo issue. His charge that the press
was promoting racial divisions and his attack of C. Virginia
Fields for siding with Giuliani and the police in 1999 was of
little help.72 For his part, Ferrer tried to shift attention from
the issue by proposing a reinstatement of a tax on stock transfers
to pay for public education costs. Predictably, this did not go well
in the financial community. More damaging was the reaction
of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver who joined those who
rejected and ridiculed the proposal by arguing that it would
not help the economy of the city.73

At this point, Ferrer was dubbed “gaffe-prone and ignorant” by
New York Times reporter Diane Cardwell. The problem, in her
view, was his “slip-ups, his seeming misstatements and the
substance of his proposals.” Ferrer’s own response to these
criticisms unwittingly reaffirmed them: “Look, I know that you’re
running for the most important job in this city, the second-most
important in the country, and you’re going to get scrutinized,”
he said to Cardwell in a telephone interview. “I don’t mind the
scrutiny. I do mind using a tense of the verb or any other linguistic device as a convenient way to ignore 1.1 million kids.”77
One could easily visualize a puzzled reader going, “huh?”
On April 27, a Marist Institute poll drove another nail into
Ferrer’s campaign coffin. After leading the mayor by six points
in March, Ferrer was now behind by a whopping 13 points, 38
to 51 percent.78 “Polls are going to go up or down,” was

Anthony Weiner called the stock transfer tax “sheer folly” and

Ferrer’s lame response to the news. The poll also showed an

Bill Thompson quickly distanced himself from the proposal

alarming slippage in support among blacks and only a small

by hedging. The Daily News called it simplistic, silly, and nutty.

advantage over the mayor in support among Latinos.79 In

According to the paper “kicking a political campaign into high
gear by calling for a tax hike was, to put it charitably, a bold
gambit,” a remark that was more sarcastic than laudatory.
“What Ferrer sloughed off,” continued the editorial, “is that
investors are not bound to the New York Stock Exchange and

March, 66 percent of blacks supported Ferrer compared to 45
percent after the Amadou Diallo remarks. On the other hand,
Bloomberg’s currency among blacks had gone up from 24 to
44 percent. Among Latinos, Bloomberg was now trailing
Ferrer by only six points—43 to 49 percent—compared to a

other trading floors. In these days of computerization, they

disadvantage of 32 points—31 to 63 percent—in March.80

can just as well do their transactions elsewhere, and avoid paying

This was simply amazing and there was still a primary to worry

the tax. And there go thousands of financial-sector jobs.”74 The
New York Times added its voice to the chorus of critics by call-

about. Ferrer endorsed Bloomberg’s subway-frisking policy (only
to criticize it during the July television debate),81 accused the

ing Ferrer’s proposal unimpressive and charging that it undermined the mayor’s negotiating position with the state.75 The

76 Diane Cardwell, “Sharpton Backs No Candidate...”
77 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Tries to Shift the Debate, and It Shoves Back,” New York Times, April 24,
2005, p. 39.

70 Tatsha Robertson, “Mayor Fights Own Image...”

78 Maggie Haberman, “Bloomy Zooms By Ferrer In New Poll,” Daily News, April 27, 2005, p. 3.

71 Patrick D. Healy and Jim Rutenberg, “Democratic Leaders Worry Over Mayoral Race,” New York
Times, April 12, 2005, p. B1.

79 Michael Saul and Maggie Haberman, “Freddy’s Fall vs. Mike Just 1 Of His Woes,” Daily News,
April 28, 2005, p. 12.

72 Juan González, “Ferrer Never Flip-Flopped,” Daily News, April 14, 2005, p. 20.

80 Maggie Haberman, “Blooming Good News For Mayor. Polls & Spirits On Rise,” Daily News,
May 1, 2005, p. 19.

73 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Proposes Return of Tax on Stock Trades to Aid Schools,” New York
Times, April 19, 2005, p. B8.
74 Editorial, “Freddy’s Stock Takes a Plunge,” Daily News, April 20, 2005, p. 38.
75 “About that Stock Transfer Tax,” The New York Times, May 1, 2005, p. 13.

81 Patrick D. Healy, “In Debate, Candidates Unite in Criticizing Bloomberg,” The New York Times,
July 29, 2005, p. B6. Ferrer called the policy ridiculous but only as the centerpiece of an anti-terrorism
policy. In his view, the city needed bag searches as well as surveillance cameras, more police officers
on subways and buses, and more workers in token booths.
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mayor of making contributions to anti-abortion politicians,

On September 3, Ferrer received a lukewarm and backhanded

lambasted Bloomberg for endorsing push-polls attacking him,

endorsement from the New York Times. “If Mr. Ferrer is going

but nothing stuck. The mayor was still considered competent,

to be a decent candidate in the fall,” reads the editorial, “he’s

smart, and even good-looking, a reference that was played out

going to have to start talking like the intelligent public servant

in the press as a factor with the female vote. Yes, he seemed

he used to be. If we’re going to make a leap of faith, we prefer

to be using his wealth to the tune of $140 million a year in

to do it with Mr. Ferrer.”89 Meanwhile, Bloomberg continued

charitable donations to buy political support from 843 recipient

to amass support. The same day that Sharpton announced he

organizations. But the press found Ferrer’s flip-flopping a

might endorse Ferrer, Bloomberg was endorsed by the hotel

82

83

bigger flaw worth highlighting repeatedly. This enhanced Ferrer’s
image as inconsistent and incompetent.84 Reporter John
Podhoretz declared the Democratic candidates hopeless. “Not
a single one of these four [Democrats] has a snowball’s chance
in hell of beating Mike Bloomberg—short of the mayor being
caught on video doing a Paris Hilton with a yak,” he said.85
The 2005 Primary Election
By mid-August Ferrer was ahead of the Democratic pack but,
according to a Quinnipiac University poll, he was still short of
the 40 percent needed to avert a runoff election. The poll showed
Ferrer with 33 percent of the Democratic vote, Gifford Miller with
17 percent, and Virginia Fields tied at 16 percent with Anthony
Weiner.86 At the end of August, the New York Times reported that
the contest between Miller and Weiner could prove decisive to
the fortunes of Ferrer. “If the two each win large shares of the
electorate,” reads the Times report, “and a third candidate, C.
Virginia Fields, holds her own, the three could deprive Fernando
Ferrer, who is leading in all [primary] polls, from winning 40
percent of the vote, resulting in a runoff between the top two
finalists.”87 At this point, Ferrer was essentially relying on his
ethnic base for a strong showing. Polls consistently set support
for his candidacy at 30 percent of likely primary voters.88
82 David Seifman, “Mike Scores in Terror Fight,” The New York Post, July 23, 2005, p. 8; Carl
Campanile, “Leftover Green Dirt Gets Flung at Freddy,” The New York Post, July 23, 2005, p. 8; Mike
McIntire, “Mayoral Race Has Whodunit: The Anti-Ferrer Pollster Calls,” The New York Times, August 30,
2005, p. B1; Michael Saul, “Freddy Jokes: I Really am Chopped Liver,” Daily News, July 22, 2005, p. 2.
83 Thomas J. Lueck, “What’s Up and Spans City? Bloomberg’s Philanthropy,” The New York Times,
August 17, 2005, p. B4.
84 Stefan C. Friedman, “Freddy’s Latest Flip-Flop: Tax Rebates,” The New York Post, August 7,
2005, p. 19; Carl Campanile, “‘Flip-Flop Freddy’ - ‘01 Attack Document Rich With ‘05 Ammo,” The
New York Post, August 22, 2005, p. 6; Stefan C. Friedman, “Ferrer Flip-Flops on Alien Voters,” The
New York Post, September 12, 2005, p. 4; Carl Campanile, “Foes Fry Freddy Over Latest DeathPenalty ‘Flip-Flop,’” The New York Post, October 8, 2005, p. 2.
85 John Podhoretz, “Dem Four: Walking Dead,” The New York Post, August 12, 2005, p. 33.
86 David Seifman, “It’s a Three-For-All to Face Ferrer in Runoff,” The New York Post, August 19,
2005, p. 2. A Daily News story also published on August 19 had Fields and Gifford tied at 17 percent
and Weiner having only 16 percent support. See Michael Saul, “Suddenly, a 3-Way Race for No. 2
Dem,” Daily News, August 19, 2005, p. 2.

and textile workers’ unions as well as by District Council 1707
of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees. These groups had a combined membership of
75,000.90 Two days before the primary, Sharpton finally came
through with his endorsement. The press questioned the benefits of his support, arguing that Sharpton’s days as a kingmaker were essentially over, while suggesting that he could move
voters but not so late in the game.91
On September 13, primary day, as Ferrer campaigned in lower
Manhattan a passerby shouted to him that he should win
because “Rev. Al says so!”92 A WNBC/Marist poll suggested
otherwise. Most registered Democrats declared that
Sharpton’s endorsement would make no difference in their
decision. The poll also showed that 26 percent of white
Democrats were less likely to vote for Ferrer because of the
endorsement, while 15 percent of black Democrats expressed
the opposite feeling. Latino Democratic voters were equally
divided with 11 percent saying the endorsement made them
less likely to support Ferrer and 11 percent saying it made
them more likely to vote for him.93
Preliminary primary results showed that the concern over the
share of the vote obtained by Miller and Weiner was on the
mark. After all the precincts reported their results, Ferrer had
39.949 percent of the vote, a fraction shy of the 40 percent
89 Editorial, “A Democratic Candidate for Mayor,” The New York Times, September 3, 2005, p. 20.
In October the Times proceeded to endorse mayor Bloomberg for re-election despite his “obscene
unlimited spending on his political campaigns.” See Patrick D. Healy, “Times Endorses Mayor
Bloomberg for Re-election,” The New York Times, October 23, 2005, p. 38.
90 Patrick D. Healy and Diane Cardwell, “Endorsement By Sharpton To Go to Ferrer,” The New York
Times, September 10, 2005, p. B1.
91 Patrick D. Healy and Diane Cardwell, “Endorsement By Sharpton...”; Michael Saul, Celeste Katz
and Maggie Haberman, “Al’s Revved for Freddy. Sharpton Throws His Support Behind Democratic
Mayoral Front-Runner,” Daily News, September 11, 2005, p. 3.

87 “Trying to Step Out of the Other Guy’s Shadow,” New York Times, August 29, 2005, p. B1.

92 Michael Saul, “Democrats in a Cliffhanger,” Daily News, September 14, 2005, p.4.

88 “Trying to Step Out...”

93 Michael Saul, “Rev. Al Shakes up The Primary,” Daily News, September 13, 2005, p. 6.
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needed to avoid a runoff.94 Anthony Weiner obtained 29 percent

Bronx, where Latinos and blacks were 80 percent of the popu-

and Gifford Miller a mere 10 percent. This combined tally

lation, Ferrer won with 62 percent of the vote.100 These results

was significant enough to suggest that had the primary been a

still begged the question whether the divisions were a reflection

two- or even a three-way contest, Ferrer would have easily

of racism or other factors.

obtained the nomination. “The road has been long my friends,”
said Ferrer after the precinct results were in. “And we’re almost
there,” he added, “because we’re about to make history.”95
Not surprisingly, the 2005 primary vote was low. This had
been predicted by forecasters all along. Their estimates, however, proved to be higher than the actual turnout. The high
point of enthusiasm for a primary race was in 1989 when 49
percent of registered Democrats turned out to choose
between David Dinkins, Ed Koch, Harrison Goldin, and
Richard Ravitch. By 1993 that enthusiasm had waned to 22
percent. In 2001, there was a slight surge in participation
when 29 percent of Democrats bothered to cast a ballot.96 On
primary day 2005, of 2,639,845 active registered Democrats,
478,818 participated or 18.1 percent.97 This was considerably
lower than the August estimates of between 600 and 650,000
voters and lower than in previous contests.98

The Issue of Runoff Elections
The event that triggered the consideration of runoff elections
in New York was the 1965 Democratic mayoral primary that
selected Abraham Beame as the party’s mayoral candidate with
only 32 percent of the vote. In 1969, when Mario Procaccino
captured the Democratic nomination with only 33 percent of
the vote to run against John Lindsay, a serious effort to institute
the runoff primary got underway. A bipartisan mayoral panel was
established and upon its recommendation the state legislature
established the runoff effective in 1973. The law called for a
runoff if no candidate for the offices of mayor, city council
president, or comptroller received more than 40 percent of
the votes in a primary. As noted earlier, that was the year when
Herman Badillo sought the mayoral nomination for a second
time. It is ironic that he lost the nomination to Abraham
Beame in a runoff, given that he was a member of the bipartisan panel that recommended its institution.101

The primary electorate appeared sharply divided by race. A

In 1985 a federal judge struck down the runoff law declaring it

preliminary analysis of selected districts published by the New

unconstitutional. But the law was upheld on appeal because,

York Times showed that Ferrer was largely supported by

according to the court, “the record shows that the primary-

Latinos, Fields was largely supported by blacks, while Weiner

runoff law was never intended to deny minority voters—and

and Miller were more strongly supported by whites than

does not have the effect of denying them—an equal opportu-

Ferrer and Miller were by Latinos and blacks respectively.

nity to participate in the political process.” Badillo was disap-

This preliminary analysis also showed that, of all the candi-

pointed and in a turnaround on his early attitude and position,

dates, Ferrer had the greatest support among Latinos and

called on the legislature to eliminate the requirement.102

blacks with a combined 94 percent support in selected districts; in contrast, in those districts support for Fields was 88
percent.99 In Richmond, the city’s whitest county (71 percent
white), Ferrer lost to Antony Weiner by 2,420 votes. In the

In subsequent elections, the runoff contest did not involve any
minorities. But in 1997, Ruth Messinger found herself pitted
against a black candidate, the Rev. Al Sharpton. In this case, just
as in 2005, a runoff was averted after the count of absentee ballots
helped her reach the minimum 40 percent support required to

94 Patrick D. Healy, “Weiner Concedes Race for Mayor to Avert Runoff,” New York Times,
September 15, 2005, p. A1.

become the candidate. In contrast to 2005, the loser in 1997

95 Sara Kugler, “Ferrer Leads in Mayoral Primary,” Times Union, September 14, 2005, p. A3.

did not bow out gracefully. Instead, Sharpton claimed fraud in the

96 “Democratic Primary Voter Turnout,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, p. B8; http://
vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryelection/2001p.pdf <accessed September 15, 2005>; Sam
Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff,” New York Times, September 18, 2005, p. 37.
97 http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/documents/boe/enrollment_totals/enrollmenttotals.pdf <accessed
November 28, 2005>; http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2005/primary/DemMayorPubAdvbyBoro.pdf
<accessed November 28, 2005>

100 http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2005/primary/DemMayorPubAdvbyBoro.pdf <accessed
November 28, 2005>.

98 David Seifman, “‘Low’ Vote a High Note For Mayor & Freddy,” The New York Post, August 21,
2005, p. 8; David Saltonstall, “Voter Turnout or Tuned Out? Low Numbers Expected Tuesday,” Daily
News, September 10, 2005, p.10.

102 William G. Blair, “New York Runoffs Are Called Biased,” New York Times, June 4, 1985, p. B5;
Arnold H. Lubasch, “Runoffs in New York’s Primaries Barred by U.S. Judge in Bias Suit,” New York
Times, August 14, 1985, p. 1; Arnold H. Lubasch, “City Runoff in Primaries Is Upheld,” New York
Times, December 14, 1985, p. 29.

99 “Where the Candidates Found Support,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, p. B8.

101 Sam Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff...”
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absentee ballot count and sued. The lawsuit was dismissed but

After the Primary

Messinger’s candidacy was weakened and her support among black

On September 19, uncertainty over the runoff ended with the

voters was undermined. It is said that 2001was similar to 1997 in

announcement by John Ravitz, executive director of the elections

one regard: just as many blacks refused to support Messinger after

board that “it is our determination, after doing a very thorough

her feud with Sharpton, the runoff contest between Fernando

recanvassing of the paper ballots and machines, that there will

Ferrer and Mark Green was so bitter that many Latinos refused

not be a runoff between Anthony Weiner and Fernando Ferrer.”105

to support Green. This enabled Bloomberg to win the mayoralty

Many thought the board had lost its senses by insisting on

despite running as a Republican with no experience.

holding the runoff even after Weiner dropped out of the race.

One key argument against runoff elections is that they create
divisions, often along racial and ethnic lines, that prevent
opposition groups from working together to defeat a common
adversary. After his 1973 defeat, Badillo supported a civil
rights challenge to the runoff election by arguing that they
encouraged negative campaigning and discriminated against
candidates with little money. Al Sharpton was opposed to runoffs

Thus, this news was greeted by all with a sigh of relief. The
recanvassing put the vote for Ferrer at 192,243 or 40.15 percent
of the total. The day after, 1199/SEIU endorsed Ferrer.106
“Dennis Rivera has been a close friend of mine, we’ve fought
on the same side of issues, for years now,” Ferrer said in
response to 1199’s endorsement.107 This meant that he would
have the support of his base plus the assistance of a well-oiled

until 1997 when the runoff became his only opportunity to

vote-getting organization. He was also poised to receive the

win the mayoral nomination. Later on he changed his mind

backing of former mayor David Dinkins. “I like the mayor,”

reverting to the position that runoffs were biased against

said Dinkins, “I consider [Bloomberg] a friend, but that does

challengers and slowed down the selection process.

not mean that I am going to endorse his candidacy.”108

In truth, runoff elections channel divisions, acrimoniously or not,

After vowing to fight Ferrer to the bitter end, Weiner recon-

103

without necessarily creating them. Consider, for example, the

sidered his position and withdrew from the race. Ferrer was both

lengths to which Anthony Weiner went to avoid disunity among

surprised and elated. “I’m proud to support Freddy Ferrer,” Weiner

Democrats after losing the primary by not only withdrawing

declared, “He has the record, he has the brains, he has the commit-

from the 2005 race but also by emphasizing the need for all

ment, he has the understanding, to not only run in circles around

Democrats to support Ferrer. Whatever pragmatic calculations

Republican Mike Bloomberg, but to lift up our city.”109 Weiner

may have motivated his decision, it also reveals a moderate,

may have been sincere when he declared himself willing to lose

conciliatory leadership style. A leadership style that exacerbates

rather than to be part of an in-house fight that would doom the

conflict makes divisions deeper, runoff or not. Al Sharpton was

chances of defeating Bloomberg in November. Yet to the press

not conciliatory in 1997 nor in 2001. Ferrer chose to do nothing

it was clear that his decision was a mix of lofty and pragmatic

for Green in 2001. Was that an effect of the runoff or simple

considerations.110 On September 18, Congressman Charles Rangel

payback? Whether minority or coalition candidates are able to

switched his endorsement to Ferrer. To highlight black-Latino

win the nomination in a runoff election is more a function of

unity after the primary, Ferrer marched up Adam Clayton Powell,

their access to resources and their ability to manage conflict

Jr. Boulevard in Harlem with Rangel, C. Virginia Fields, and

than of the runoff itself. Further, in a racially polarized environment

Al Sharpton during the African-American Day Parade.111

the runoff election matters little. If they are the majority, voters
who are unwilling to support a minority candidate will carry
the day whether there is a single primary or not.104

105 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing of Workers In Health
Care,” New York Times, September 20, 2005, p. B1.
106 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge, Bloomberg Tacks Left,” New York Times, September 21,
2005, p. A1.
107 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing…”

103 This and the previous paragraph are based on Sam Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff...”

108 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing…”

104 Harold W. Stanley, “The Runoff: The Case for Retention,” PS: Political Science and Politics 18:2
(Spring 1985): 231-236. Other research suggests that attitudinal changes over time, better minority
candidates, and class explain minority success in runoff elections better than the runoff itself. See
Charles S. Bullock, III and A. Brock Smith, “Black Success in Local Runoff Elections,” The Journal of
Politics, 52:4 (November 1990): 1205-1220.

109 Patrick D. Healy, “Weiner Concedes Race...”
110 Michael Saul and Celeste Katz, “Weiner Concedes,” Daily News, September 15, 2005, p. 7.
111 Al Baker, “In Harlem, Old Questions Cool Welcome for Ferrer,” New York Times, September 19,
2005, p. B1.
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On September 21, New York Times reporter Patrick Healy declared

this morning and he never mentioned anything about Freddy

that Ferrer was “in solid shape for the general election” after

Ferrer.”119 When asked by a reporter if God was indeed on his

having “quickly united old rivals, labor leaders, and party

side, Ferrer lamely replied: “I hope so.”120 In October, Ferrer

elders behind him while also proving unexpectedly nimble at

alienated some of his gay supporters by standing side by side

putting Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg on the defensive.”

at a campaign event with homophobic Senator Rubén Díaz,

This gloss on reality was strange given that Bloomberg

Sr. “It’s disappointing that Mr. Ferrer has chosen to campaign

continued to enjoy widespread support in the polls. At this

with someone with such a history of anti-gay comments,” said

point, Bloomberg’s campaign strategy seemed to hinge on

Patrick Murphy, a gay candidate for city council in Manhattan

broadening his support among white Democrats and

and a member of the national board of directors of the Log

112

good-government liberals while chipping away at Ferrer’s
African-American and Latino base. He came out against the
nomination of John Roberts to be the chief justice of the
Supreme Court. He also criticized the Bush administration for
a racially insensitive response to the devastation caused by
hurricane Katrina. According to Stu Loeser, a spokesman for
Bloomberg’s campaign, Ferrer was stuck with his traditional
supporters. In contrast, the mayor was making inroads among
Ferrer’s base. “We are playing on his turf; he’s not playing on
ours,” Loeser said.113
When Ferrer’s campaign unveiled its slogan—“It’s a great city.
It could be greater”—the snide remarks immediately followed.114
According to some, the endorsements of David Dinkins,
Charles Rangel, and SEIU/1199 were just “low-hanging fruit.”115
Ferrer needed a bigger television presence, which the campaign could not afford, a focus on policy issues, an emphasis
on competence and efficiency in governance, a rejection of
partisanship, and a greater emphasis on class inequality.116
Instead of following this advice Ferrer claimed that he would
win because “God is on my side.”117 He was immediately blasted by Bloomberg. “I don’t know that God makes political

Cabin Republicans.121
From thereon, nothing worked for Ferrer. If he didn’t attack
the mayor he was too soft; if he attacked the mayor he was too
negative. His criticism of Bloomberg as racially insensitive for
refusing to debate him at the Apollo Theater was thrown back
at him as race-baiting.122 His calls for more affordable housing
and universal health insurance became cries in the wilderness.
How could anyone take seriously a candidate who campaigned
in Puerto Rico to persuade Puerto Rican New Yorkers to vote
for him?123 This was one of the silliest and most wasteful moves
of his campaign. On October 16, Daily News reporter Michael
Goodwin wrote: “In the Bible, the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse are named Death, War, Famine and Pestilence. If
you’re a New York City Democrat, they are named David Dinkins,
Ruth Messinger, Mark Green and Fernando Ferrer. Like some
ancient scourge, those four have taken turns killing their party’s
dreams of winning City Hall.”124 At that point, even the
Democratic Party was certain Ferrer would lose. By then the
party put a hold on a February promise of $1 million in campaign funds. According to party insiders it was imprudent to invest
so much money on a candidate with no chance of winning.125

endorsements. I’ve never heard God do that,” said the mayor

November 8: Registration and Turnout

facetiously during a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Brooklyn.118 A

In 2001, there were 2.4 million registered Democrats in New

Bloomberg supporter, the Rev. A.R. Bernard of the Christian

York City. By 2005 the enrollment figure was 2.6 million. The

Cultural Center in southeast Queens, added: “I spoke to God
119 Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it…”
112 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge…”
113 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge…”
114 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute This New Slogan? Who Will Remember It?,” New York Times,
September 26, 2005, p. B4.
115 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute…”
116 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute…”
117 Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it Over Freddy for God Claim,” The New
York Post, September 27, 2005, p. 2.
118 Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it…”

120 Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it…”
121 Michael Saul, “New Freddy Stump Slip Appears With Anti Gay Advocate,” Daily News, October
1, 2005, p. 6.
122 Patrick D. Healy, “Ferrer’s Debate Issue: Smart Move or Racially Divisive?,” The New York Times,
October 6, 2005, p. B7.
123 Heidi Singer, “Freddy Tries to Get Out The Vote - In Puerto Rico”, The New York Post, October
16, 2005, p. 13.
124 Michael Goodwin, “United, They Stall,” Daily News, October 16, 2005, p. 39.
125 David Seifman and Carl Campanile, “National Dems Have Stiffed Ferrer for $1M,” The New York
Post, October 11, 2005, p. 2.
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200,000 increase was unprecedentedly high, much of it the

The general election vote went just about as predicted by

result of intense voter registration efforts in 2004 during the

many after the primary, except that it was worse than predict-

presidential election.126 In contrast, Republican registration in

ed for Ferrer. In September, it was expected that Ferrer would

the city did not grow in any significant way. This was not

lose to Bloomberg 47 to 53 percent. The results were not

surprising. In 2004, Republicans had wisely ignored not just

even close to the prediction. Ferrer received 477,903 votes to

New York City but the entire state, despite having chosen the

Bloomberg’s 723,635, losing 39 to 59 percent.130 This was the

city for their national convention. It was one thing to use New
York to energize the party for the last stretch of the presidential
race and another to invest resources in a state that was guaranteed
to go to the Democrats. Could it be that turnout by newly
registered Democratic voters could beat the odds against Ferrer?
A count of Spanish surnames on the voter rolls in 2005 revealed
that at 680,000, Latinos were 26 percent of Democratic registrants. According to reporter Juan González, this suggested
that Latinos accounted for as much as half of the 200,000
increase in Democratic registrations since 2001. “The person
most likely to benefit from all of this is Fernando Ferrer,” he
wrote. “Many Hispanic residents have grown tired of being
regarded as second-class citizens in this town. They’ve longed
for decades to see one of their own leaders become mayor.
That’s why Ferrer captured more than 80 percent of the
Latino vote in his losing runoff four years ago against fellow
Democrat Mark Green.”127
González suggested that in 2005 Ferrer could count on 65
percent of Latino Democrats. That was the case in March, but
after the Amadou Diallo remarks, Latino support for Ferrer
decreased by 16 points to 49 percent. During the primary,

highest victory margin in a mayoral race since 1937. Ferrer
completed the race as the lowest Democratic vote-getter in
the city since 1917.131 About half of the black vote went to
Bloomberg and close to 3 in 10 Latinos supported the incumbent. Bloomberg lost Harlem but the vote for him there was a
significant 45 percent. Most of his black support came from
middle-class African-Americans and West Indians. In southeastern Queens he carried the entire 29th assembly district
and also beat Ferrer in several largely Caribbean districts in
central Brooklyn. For his part, Ferrer won the Bronx,
Washington Heights, and did best in neighborhoods with
high Puerto Rican concentrations.132
According to a poll by Pace University, 30 percent of Latinas
supported Bloomberg; they were the least likely to vote for
him. Jews were the most likely to support Bloomberg’s reelection with 7 out of 10 doing so. This poll attributed less
support for Bloomberg from blacks— 46 percent compared to
53 percent for Ferrer. In this survey, Ferrer also edged
Bloomberg among Democrats—50 to 48 percent. The findings for Latinos were 62 to 36 in favor of Ferrer. Bloomberg
was found winning the votes of whites at 66 percent and the
votes of all religious groups—72 percent of Jews, 58 percent
of Protestants, and 57 percent of Catholics. Astonishingly,

Latinos were steadfast in their support of their compatriot.

even a majority of those making less than $20 thousand a

But even in the Bronx, his 62 percent tally included the votes

year—56 percent—voted for Bloomberg.133

of blacks. An October 26 poll revealed that among Latino voters Ferrer led Bloomberg by only five points, 48 percent to 43

Ferrer was certain that his populist message had been heard.

percent.128 He was behind with everyone else—liberals, blacks,

In his view, his defeat was not his fault. “I have the dubious

women, even Democrats. Democrats represented 53 percent

distinction of having run against the best-financed candidate

of the voters but only 37 percent intended to support Ferrer.
In contrast, 49 percent were expected to vote for Bloomberg.129
126 Juan González, “Hispanics Can Win it For Freddy,” Daily News, August 18, 2005, p. 14.
127 Juan González, “Hispanics Can Win it...”
128 Frankie Edozien, “Freddy Losing Latin Edge: Poll,” The New York Post, October 26, 2005, p. 2.
129 Patrick D. Healy and Marjorie Connelly, “Even Among Democratic Voters, Poll Finds Ferrer Is
Well Behind,” The New York Times, October 28, 2005, p. A1.

130 “The Races in New York City,” New York Times, November 10, 2005, p. B6.
131 Patrick D. Healy, “Bloomberg Cruises to Re-election Victory, The New York Times, November 9,
2005, p.1.
132 Sam Roberts, “Mayor Crossed Ethnic Barriers For Big Victory,” The New York Times, November 10,
2005, p. A1.
133 Carl Campanile, “The Mike Spike; Breakdown of Mayor’s Landslide Victory,” The New York
Post, November 10, 2005, p. 29. According to Juan González, “Higher-income neighborhoods,
whether black or white, went for Bloomberg, while the poorest neighborhoods, including all those
with big Latino populations, went for Ferrer.” He provided no evidence to support this claim. See Juan
González, “Freddy Holds Head High,” Daily News, November 10, 2005, p. 8.
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in the history of American politics,” Ferrer said. “I wouldn’t

Was Bloomberg predestined to win because of his financial

change the last year for all the money in the world.”134 Was

resources? In 2001, he spent $74 million of his own money on

money the explanation for defeat?

the campaign, outspending Mark Green five times over. Yet his

The Role of Money in 2005
At the beginning of the campaign, the money issue took a
surreal turn. The New York Times noted the well-known fact
that the incumbent was “a billionaire capable of spending
hundreds of millions of dollars of his own money on the race.”
At the same time, Molly Watkins, the press secretary for the
Campaign Finance Board, declared that “The whole point of
the [matching funds] program and why it’s good in a situation
like this is it really equalizes everybody, at the end of the day
everybody will have about the same money to spend.”135
According to Ferrer’s chief fundraiser, Leo Hindery, Jr.,
Bloomberg’s deep pockets were Ferrer’s biggest challenge. “Mike
has something we’ve never seen before, which is literally a
bottomless checkbook,” he said during a private conversation
that was inadvertently broadcast to a reporter’s voice mail. “We
live in this $4,950 world [referring to the limit per donor set
by the Campaign Finance Board]—we’re thrilled to get a $250
check—and we can’t do it without reaching outside the city.”136

victory was initially too close to call.139 Ultimately, his money
advantage earned him a margin of a little over 43,000 votes or
3 percentage points. Bloomberg received 719,819 votes, or 50
percent, while Green had 676,560 or 47 percent.140 Only those
willing to ignore the role of incumbency, Democratic infighting, racial conflict and resentment between blacks and Latinos,
and the contrast between the campaign performances of Ferrer
and the mayor can claim that his money was everything in
2005. According to reporter Clyde Haberman: “even without
the tens of millions of dollars that he can spend, Mr. Bloomberg
would have the upper hand.” New Yorkers “may not collectively
adore him. But neither are they turned off by him.”141
Two days before the election, Democratic leaders were already
providing a money rationale for Ferrer’s anticipated defeat.
“This is now a major problem for us,” said Charles Rangel, “that
the guy from the block who works hard for the party doesn’t
stand much chance against the guy who has $75 million.”142 In
a post-election analysis, another Democratic Party leader claimed
that “money was everything” in the race. According to

By May, Bloomberg had spent about $5.6 million on his campaign

Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Bloomberg spent so

out of $6.5 million he had at his disposal from his own money.

much money in advertisements that his campaign de facto

In contrast, Ferrer had spent only $245,000.137 Ferrer was limited by

suppressed the vote. In his view, this was all with the blessing

law to spending only $5.7 million in the primary race. The mayor

provided by the rules of the city’s Campaign Finance Board.143

faced no limits due to his reliance on private resources. Another

Turnout was indeed dismal. According to the Board of Elections,

angle in the use of personal resources concerned the role

the total number of active registered voters in the city as of

played by philanthropic giving by the mayor in his political

March 2005 was 3,903,852. According to the New York Times

fortunes. In 2004 Bloomberg’s giving to city charities amounted

of November 10, 2005 the mayoral vote was 1,201,538 or 30.7

to millions of dollars, including organizations in black and

percent of registered voters. Thus, if turnout was critical to a

Hispanic neighborhoods. To many this was an avenue for

Ferrer victory, the explanation of his defeat is simple. Bloomberg

obtaining political support that was not only questionable but

deployed close to 10,000 volunteers on election day in a get-out-

also unavailable to the mayor’s opponents.138 The practice and
the charges were repeated in 2005.
134 Michael Saul, “Freddy: We Were Heard. Loser is Upbeat After His Defeat in Uphill Battle,” Daily
News, November 9, 2005, p. 5.
135 Michael Slackman, “Mayoral Candidates Show Early Fund-Raising Prowess,” New York Times,
January 13, 2005, p. B8.
136 Jim Rutenberg, “Misstep on Voice Mail System Reveals Ferrer Backers’ Strategy,” New York
Times, March 4, 2005, p. B1.
137 Patrick D. Healy, “Mayor’s Reported Spending Dwarfs That of His Democratic Rivals,” The New
York Times, May 17, 2005, p. B6.
138 David Saltonstall, “Mike’s Camp Eyes Ferrer Funding,” Daily News, June 19, 2005, p. 24.

139 Adam Nagourney, “The 2001 Elections: Mayor Bloomberg Edges Green in Race for Mayor,” The
New York Times, November 7, 2001, p. A1; Michael Saul, “Mike Barely Misses Mark Set By Fiorello,”
Daily News, November 30, 2005, p. 14.
140 Stefan Fatsis, “Mayoral Race in New York is too Close to Call,” Wall Street Journal, November
6, 2001, p. A12; David Usborne, “Campaign Against Terrorism: Billionaire Who Swamped City With
Dollars Inherits a Troubled Legacy,” The Independent (London), November 8, 2001, p. 3.
141 Clyde Haberman, “Long Shots Do Come In. Ask the Mayor,” The New York Times, May 17,
2005, p. B1.
142 Patrick D. Healy, “For the City’s Democrats, a Grim Future Could Last Long Beyond Tuesday,”
The New York Times, November 6, 2005, p. 41.
143 Remarks by Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Workshop on the 2005 New York City
Mayoral Election, Somos el Futuro Winter Conference, November 13, 2005, Wyndham El San Juan
Hotel, Isla Verde, Puerto Rico.
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the-vote (GOTV) blitz. Ferrer had only a few thousand peo-

a congressional district that was demographically tailored for

ple working the streets and the phones. His GOTV effort was

victory. This was not the case when he sought the mayoral

highly reliant on hope—on the wish that his supporters would

candidacy in 1969, 1973, and 1977. Babby Quintero was right

turn out in droves.

in noticing the demographic spread of Puerto Ricans in the

144

There is no reason why the Democratic party organization
had to be left behind by the Bloomberg campaign’s GOTV

city during the 1960s but she overestimated the impact of
their growth in population. By 1970, Puerto Rican numbers
had increased by 33 percent but they were only 10 percent of

effort. Bloomberg mobilized volunteers rather than paid workers.

the total population and about 9 percent of the electorate.148

The Democratic Party could have matched that number

Fourteen years later, their share of the electorate had increased

instead of making a minimal effort and wishing for the best. In

by only one percentage point. In 1977, an important segment

fact, it could be argued that the abandonment of Ferrer by the

of the white electorate may have been ready for a Puerto

party contributed more to his defeat than his money troubles.145

Rican mayoral candidate, as reflected in the endorsements of

In any event, turnout in 2005—31 percent—was much higher

the New York Political Action Council and sociologist

than in 2001—14.5 percent—even though Bloomberg

Herbert Gans, but, as the actions of Percy Sutton, David

overspent his rivals in both elections by large margins. This

Dinkins and Charles Rangel suggest, African Americans were

inconsistency makes the claim of vote suppression due to

not. Even in 1985, when Badillo’s chances for the nomination

campaign spending suspect.146

were best, the city’s Puerto Rican/Latino electorate was still

In 2005 Bloomberg spent just as much as in 2001. Was his

small and African Americans were still not ready for him.149

victory a case of “votes count, but resources decide”? If that

The problem of the size and nature of the electorate was an

was the case, how does one explain a similar amount of money

issue later on as well. In 2001 Hispanics were between 15 and

producing widely different margins of victory in two different

18 percent of voters but the Hispanic electorate was highly

elections? The answer to the question comes down to this:

fractured and riddled with fault lines and tensions.150 In 2005,

Despite his failings, Bloomberg was a relatively popular incum-

Rodríguez was the most common surname in New York voter

bent and Ferrer proved to be an ineffectual challenger. As the

registration rolls and the city was majority minority. But Mexicans

New York Post put it on election day: “Michael Bloomberg, he’s

felt ignored by Ferrer, C. Virginia Fields drew resources away

proven his competence, kept crime down and breathed hope

from him in the Dominican community, and unlike in Los

into the schools; his opponent, Fernando Ferrer, has no viable

Angeles, Hispanics were not key coalition partners.151 In 2001

plan.”

147

Money or not, Bloomberg had so much going for

him that even a better and better-funded challenger than
Ferrer may not have stood a chance of defeating him.

and 2005, these contextual factors simply compounded a critical
situation created by the lack of an effective candidate.
For Badillo, ethnicity was a double-edged sword. But ethnicity

A Puerto Rican (Latino or Minority) Mayor

was not the only factor that militated against him. He was

for New York?

perceived as rigid and arrogant, did not have support from key

Herman Badillo was able to win a seat in Congress in 1970

elements of the labor movement, and in one instance was stymied

for a number of reasons, the most important being running in

by his inability to meet the legal requirements necessary to

144 Patrick D. Healy, “Bloomberg Cruises…”

148 Peter Kihss, “Census Disputed on Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, April 20, 1972, p. 36;
“El Diario-La Prensa Speaks,” editorial, November 7, 1972, p. 17; Miguel Gallastegui, “Millones de
Votantes Hispanos Concurrirán A Ejercer su Deber Cívico en las Elecciones,” El Diario-La Prensa,
November 7, 1972, p. 15.

145 The Clintons for example, did for Ferrer only what they were asked and not more. In 2001
President Clinton campaigned three times with Mark Green but only once with Ferrer in 2005.
Hillary distanced herself from Ferrer lest she alienate a mayor that by all accounts acted more like a
Democrat than a Republican. See Patrick D. Healy, “Clintons Give Ferrer a Hand While Staying at
Arm’s Length,” The New York Times, October 21, 2005, p. A1; Errol Louis, “Disgrace of The Dems.
Vaunted Party Organization Abandoned Ferrer & Its Principles,” Daily News, November 9, 2005, p. 39.
146 See Diane Cardwell, “The 2001 Elections: The Voting; Confusion, but It Was No Florida,” The
New York Times, November 7, 2001, p. D1
147 “Vote Today,” The New York Post, November 8, 2005, p. 32.

149 At least not African-American political leaders, as Chris McNickle shows. Op. Cit., pp. 285-286.
150 Elizabeth Kolbert, “That’s Freddy; Can race politics make Fernando Ferrer the next mayor?” The
New Yorker, March 19, 2001, p. 52; Sam Roberts, “New York’s Ever-Changing Electorate: Next, The
White Minority,” New York Times, September 13, 2005, p. 1.
151 Roberts, “New York’s Ever-Changing…;” Diane Cardwell and Jonathan P. Hicks, “On West
Coast, A Lesson Plan for Ferrer Bid,” New York Times, May 20, 2005, p. 1.
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run. Badillo prided himself as a maverick but this also cost

Roberts for the Supreme Court endeared him to pro-choice

him. He was not always able to rally the necessary troops fully

Democrats. Finally, his campaign was managed efficiently,

behind him in part because of his reputation as nobody’s yes-man

in a way that Ferrer’s was not. Compared to Ferrer, whose

and in part because Puerto Rican elites and the community

gaffes destroyed his credibility, the mayor appeared to be a

itself were divided.

superb manager.155

152

All this notwithstanding, given his back-

ground and the context in which he did so, it is remarkable
that he was able to mount four credible attempts to gain the

According to Newsday, Ferrer lost because he ran an inefficient

mayoral nomination. To follow his ambition Badillo had to

campaign. Money disadvantages were a factor but the lack of

fight the party organization and he had to fight the system.

an effective message also played a role. The Amadou Diallo

But neither the party structure nor the political establishment

remarks in March and his stock trades tax proposal in April

was foreclosed to his overtures. He was never a party regular

turned the tide of support against him. His lack of a concrete

but he used party resources when it suited him. He successfully

agenda and Democratic defections were crucial as well.156 In

challenged the rules of the game when they were unfavorable

Brooklyn and Queens County, party leaders provided little or

to his goals and he did so with the very tools provided by the

no support to Ferrer’s campaign.157 One reason given for the

political system. Ultimately, he was an odd figure: a reformer

absence of support by some Democrats was lingering resentment

to some, a loose cannon to others. When the party was king,

against Ferrer. Many Democrats blamed his campaign manager

he fought the party. Others were successful running as outsid-

Roberto Ramírez for handing Bloomberg the mayoralty in 2001 as

ers, most notably Wagner in 1961 and Frank Torres in 1962.

a result of the refusal of Ferrer’s campaign to support Mark

But Torres ran in an assembly district, not citywide, and

Green.158 Ferrer’s appeal to Democrats was also undermined

Wagner had a citywide base of support outside the machine

by the fact that Bloomberg endorsed income tax increases for

that Badillo never had. 153

wealthy New Yorkers, health care for the uninsured and other

In 2005 Fernando Ferrer was rightly characterized as an
imperfect candidate. He had his three chances and in his case
the Spanish saying applies; in the future there will be no
Freddy to kick around. If there had been a better Puerto
Rican candidate, would have he been a loser as well? This is

social services, and considered an extension on a temporary
tax surcharge on individuals with incomes of $500,000 a year.
This made the mayor appear more like the Democrat he had
been all his life before he switched to the Republican Party in
order to be able to run in 2001.159

quite likely. As early as August, Latinos, for example, were

Ferrer also fought against significant historical odds. Only

persuaded that Bloomberg had a good record. The leadership

twice in fifty years had a challenger unseated a mayoral

qualities they were looking for in the next mayor pretty much

incumbent after one term—when Abraham Beame was

described the incumbent: independent, knowledgeable, and

replaced by Ed Koch in 1977 and when Rudolph Giuliani

decisive.154 Bloomberg had plenty of money to get his

defeated David Dinkins in 1993. In both cases the voters

message across in targeted fashion. But he was also able to

perceived the incumbents as failures, an assessment that very

craft a message that appealed to a broad spectrum of voters
across class, race, and ethnicity. Another factor was his ability
to distance himself from President Bush. His criticism of the
administration’s response to the Katrina disaster in Louisiana
helped him with minority voters. His rejection of John
152 He was considered “a loner” and not particularly interested in advice from others. See video
interviews with Manuel “Manny” Díaz, June 10, 2004 and Armando Montano, 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
153 Video interview with Frank, Austin, and Alma Torres, 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
154 National Association of Elected and Appointed Officials, Voces del Pueblo Project (2005).

few shared about Bloomberg. Ferrer’s place in history was
ironic, an example of Puerto Ricans being in the right place at
the wrong time; he was a product of the regular Democratic
155 Lisa L. Colangelo and David Saltonstall, “Bloomberg Wins by a K.O. Crushes Ferrer by Nearly
20-point margin,” Daily News, November 9, 2005, p. 3.
156 Bryan Virasami and Graham Rayman, “Election 2005; In Defeat Ferrer Silent on his Future,”
Newsday, November 9, 2005, p. A20.
157 Dan Janison, “Big Win for Bloomberg,” Newsday, November 9, 2005, p. A2.
158 Diane Cardwell, “Racial Politics of 2001; Unhealed Wounds in 2005,” The New York Times, May 8,
2005, p. 33.
159 Jim Rutenberg and Patrick D. Healy, “3 Democrats and the Mayor Vie for Third Party’s Nod,”
The New York Times, May 12, 2005, p. B3.
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organization at a time when machine politics was discredited.160
Widely reported feelings of despair among Democrats about
their prospects, including public discussions about the possibility of the late entrance of a better challenger, also undermined Ferrer’s standing among voters.161 Had the nomination
been a formal contractual arrangement, such discussions
would have been tantamount to a breach of contract.

emphasize managerial ability, not ethnic appeal. But why should
it be one or the other? If the history of New York City politics
shows anything is that ethnic appeals are part and parcel of
the city’s political process. Ethnicity is real, it cannot be wished
away. Changing demographics change the character of ethnicity
over time but ethnic identity and the role it plays in the political
process, for better or for worse, is a constant variable.

Did polls cause Ferrer’s defeat, as Roberto Ramírez emphatically
declared after the election?162 Polls both reflect and shape
public opinion. Push polls in particular, shape more than
reflect public opinion. The polls that suggested that Ferrer
might not be able to avoid a runoff and the ones that measured
his popularity and predicted his defeat were not push polls but
rather legitimate surveys. It is impossible to know whether the
forecast that he would be short of the 40 percent support
required to avoid a runoff primary was a factor shaping the
primary result. But if anything, Ferrer beat that particular poll
by a significant margin—the prediction was that he would
receive 33 percent of the vote; instead he obtained a little over
the required 40 percent. One thing is clear: as Ferrer’s behavior
became more and more erratic, his support in the polls began
to go down. The positions Ferrer took were his own. No poll
told him to flip-flop or to show incompetence. The fact that
polls predicted his failure is no evidence that pollsters conspired against Ferrer.

Before ballots were cast in New York, many wondered if Ferrer
would be able to follow in the footsteps of the newly elected
mayor of Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa. Ferrer even sought
the endorsement of the Los Angeles mayor, hoping it would
help his efforts.163 In fact, the Los Angeles mayoral election
holds a lesson for the future but it is not that competence trumps
ideology. James Hahn’s inability to consolidate his alliance with
African-Americans benefited Villaraigosa. Hahn also alienated
key supporters by fighting the secession movement in the San
Fernando Valley and was hurt by charges of administrative
improprieties. He was unlucky rather than incompetent.
Villarraigosa did not campaign on the basis of competent
solutions to the city’s problems. He avoided ideological
posturing rather than ideology. His plans were ambiguous and
his emphasis was on the need for change. He also built a
broad coalition of supporters. He was competent but, perhaps
more importantly, he was also lucky.164

Did the election show that pragmatism and competence trump
ideology? Giuliani’s wide-margin victory over Ruth Messinger
in 1997 was seen as proof that competence was more important
than ideology. The same claim was made immediately after
the 2005 election. To win, the Democratic Party should
160 “Ferrer came of age in the days when the Bronx Democratic organization was still a robust
(and largely Jewish) enterprise, and he got ahead not by challenging the machine but by working
within it.” Elizabeth Kolbert, “That’s Freddy; Can race politics make Fernando Ferrer the next mayor?”
The New Yorker, March 19, 2001, p. 52. Mollenkopf, et al. characterize New York City as “highly
centralized and politicized, with a persistent ‘machine politics’ style.” (p. 2) In John Mollenkopf, Ana
Champeny, Raphael Sonensheim, and Mark Drayse, “Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration in the 2005
Mayoral Elections in Los Angeles and New York,” paper presented at the American Political Science
Association meetings, September 2, 2006, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It is true that in New York City
the Democratic party organization is alive and well but the electorate and the media are not keen on
the idea. As Fernando Ferrer found out, his association with regular machine politics was a negative with the press and the public. More recently, speculation on what lies ahead for New York after
Bloomberg has suggested that economic notables “value a business resumé over party affiliation” and
the public worries that once Bloomberg is gone the city may “revert to a traditional partisan-infused
bureaucracy.” See Michael Barbaro, “As Bloomberg’s Time Wanes, Titans Seek Mayor in his Mold,”
New York Times, July 7, 2008, p. A1.

Finally, there is the issue of race and ethnicity. Bloomberg did
very well among minority voters, particularly among Latinas
who were the segment of the electorate least likely to favor
him. This strongly suggests that racial and ethnic prejudice
was not Bloomberg’s trump card against Ferrer. Nevertheless,
what do we make of the racially divided primary vote? Despite
the primary’s racially delineated results it is unlikely that racial
and ethnic prejudice were the driving force. By September it
was clear that Ferrer’s overall loss of credibility and support
was the result of other factors. Ferrer still held sway over black
and Latino voters and his support among whites was significant.
The willingness of whites, mostly hardcore liberals but also some
Catholics, to support an out-group candidate was demonstrated

161 Patrick D. Healy, “Democrats Still Searching For a Stronger Challenger,” The New York Times,
May 23, 2005, p. B3.

163 Michael Saul, “A Big Lift for Freddy. L.A. Mayor Set to Endorse Him,” Daily News, August 25,
2005, p. 2.

162 Remarks by Roberto Ramírez, Workshop on the 2005 New York City Mayoral Election,
Somos el Futuro Winter Conference, November 13, 2005, Wyndham El San Juan Hotel, Isla Verde,
Puerto Rico.

164 Raphael J. Sonenshein and Susan H. Pinkus, “Latino Incorporation reaches the Urban Summit:
How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor’s Race,” PS: Political Science and Politics
XXXVIII:4 (October 2005): 713-721.
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in 1989 with the election of David Dinkins.165 Polls in 2004

than whites even though Ferrer’s position was an affront

and early 2005, suggested a Ferrer victory over Bloomberg in

to blacks.

accordance to perceptions of Ferrer as an attractive alternative
to an embattled incumbent. Once Ferrer’s true colors began to
show he began to lose support; nothing he did after the primary

In sum, this historical account suggests that the path to mayoral
power in New York City is open to all. The keen reader can

stemmed the tide. Thus, the racial and ethnic delineation of

rightfully say that this is not news. Recent studies support the

the primary vote is more likely a case of ethnoracial solidarity

contention that the urban political system is open.169 Perhaps

and racial inoculation than racial polarization.166

the best confirmation that overall the political system is open
and pluralistic can be found in the volume edited by Rodolfo

Divisions in partisan voting by race and ethnicity are sharp

Espino, David L. Leal, and Kenneth J. Meier, titled Latino Politics,

and persistent, for African Americans more so than for

Identity, Mobilization, and Representation (Charlottesville: University

Latinos.167 Racial and ethnic divisions in voting generally are

of Virginia Press, 2007). In this volume, the question of pluralism

problematic but survey research has shown that, even though

is not even addressed except for a remark by Rodney Hero in the

they are willing to support out-group candidates, given the

Foreword that the status of Latinos in the political system shows

choice, Latinos prefer to support a co-ethnic. No one can

“some signs of pluralism and inclusion, other evidence of relatively

question the willingness of African Americans to support white

low status within a hierarchy and a minimal presence in certain

candidates but they also tend to prefer their own candidates.

institutions.” (p. xiv). The question of representation, for example,

This dynamic may have been at play during the primary. The

is examined in terms of process and substance but the possibility

statement by Raul Amador in 2001 that he was willing to support

of representation is taken for granted. At the national level, the

Bloomberg but only if Ferrer was not a candidate because

nomination of Barack Obama as the Democratic presidential

Ferrer was “one of us,” suggests a calculation along those lines.

candidate and his election in November, offers unequivocal

While Latinos, blacks, and whites could agree that Ferrer was

evidence of accessibility. The cost of this particular opportunity

not the best candidate, Latinos and blacks were more willing

was substantial but it was real and it produced results as well.

168

than whites to put that aside for the sake of ethnic solidarity.
The fact that some blacks were readier than some whites to

The study of New York City mayoral politics by Chris

overlook Ferrer’s position on the murder of Amadou Diallo was

McNickle, cited throughout this paper, clearly shows that

a good illustration of inoculation: blacks were more tolerant

access to the mayoralty is pretty much open to all. McNickle
concludes his analysis showing how blacks treaded that path

165 See McNickle, Op. Cit., p. 305 and Asher Arian, et al., Changing New York City Politics (New
York: Routledge, 1991). Dinkins’ downfall had little to do with his race. See John Mollenkopf, A
Phoenix in the Ashes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 219.
166 See Susan Howell, “Racial Polarization, Reaction to Urban Conditions, and the Approval of
Black Mayors,” in Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks, eds. Black and Multiracial Politics
in America (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 60-83. In the case that Howell analyzes,
polarization entails evaluations of black mayors that are sharply delineated by race regardless of
performance while inoculation entails evaluations that are more or less harsh depending on racial
identity. Inoculation means that black voters go easier than whites on black mayors, even if both agree
that mayoral performance is substandard.
167 For race see William J. Keefe and Marc J. Hetherington, Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in
America, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quesrterly Press, 2003), pp. 228-230. For ethnicity see
Kim Geron, Latino Political Power (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 104-105. According to the
2006 Latino National Survey, while 45 percent of Latinos voted Democratic, only 36 percent considered
themselves Democrats. See Luis R. Fraga, et al. Latino National Survey (LNS), 2006 [Computer File],
ICPSR20862-v1. (Miami, FL: Geoscape International [producer], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2008-05-27), pp. 67, 69.
168 For Latinos see Rodolfo De La Garza, et al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, And Cuban
Perspectives On American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 136, 138. In this survey,
Puerto Ricans were more likely than Mexicans or Cubans to support a co-ethnic candidate if they
had a choice. The 2006 Latino National Survey suggests that, while for 50 percent of Latinos ethnicity
is very important as a criterion for candidate preference, 60 percent are willing to overlook ethnicity
for the sake of issues. See Op. Cit, pp. 6-7, 75-76. In the case of Puerto Ricans, the campaigns of
Badillo and Ferrer provide evidence in support of the proposition concerning ethnic preferences and
there’s evidence from Hartford, Connecticut as well. See José E. Cruz, Identity and Power: Puerto
Rican Politics and the Challenge of Ethnicity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). For African
Americans see Marcus D. Pohlman, Black Politics in Conservative America, third edition (New York:
Sloan Publishing, 2008), pp. 190, 210, n.28. The findings cited by Pohlman are for presidential elections.

successfully. He suggests that “the times [mid-1990s] do not
yet favor a Hispanic candidate for mayor.”170 But why not,
exactly? Puerto Ricans have yet to make it but this reflects
their inability to match capability with feasibility rather than
being the result of insurmountable structural obstacles or
entrenched racism. To say that the system is open is not to
reduce the process to cultural traits or agency factors, as some
169 See Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters, “Becoming American/Becoming
New Yorkers: Immigrant Incorporation in a Majority Minority City,” International Migration Review 36:4
(Winter 2002): 1020-1036; John Mollenkopf and John Logan, People and Politics in America’s Big
Cities, (Drum Major Institute and Century Foundation, May 2003). “Becoming American…” notes
the existence of social prejudice and discrimination while also observing that the response is often
“increased effort and a sustained focus on success.” (p. 1030) The study also notes that “the struggle
for minority empowerment has established new entry points into mainstream institutions and created
many new minority-run institutions.” (p. 1032) The system is open but nothing is given away without
struggle. Similarly, People and Politics… notes the existence of a representation gap between minorities and their elected officials while suggesting that it is possible to close it over time.
170 McNickle, Op. Cit., p. 323.
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claim.171 The burden of proof is sometimes systemic and

A successful candidate will also be careful enough to avoid

sometimes not. When Puerto Ricans had a good candidate the

association with polarizing figures. This is extremely difficult

context was not favorable and when the context was favorable

because we cannot fully control the actions of others; but it is

they did not have a good candidate; the lack of a good candidate

not impossible. Ferrer could not tell Sharpton to be quiet but

magnified the impact of unfavorable contextual factors. When

he had no need to court him either. If a candidate is endorsed

the party mattered most, their candidate was a reformer; when
the party was over, their candidate was an organization man.
This is what the mismatch between capability and feasibility is
about. Puerto Rican ethnic identity is part of that equation
and it has played contradictory roles, thrusting and energizing
candidates as well as being the proverbial albatross around the
candidate’s neck. It has been a source of support, a rationale
for participation, and a proxy for substantive concerns—an
element of capability. But it has also been a barrier to
participation, an artificial boundary, and a rationale for
prejudice and discrimination—an element of feasibility.
In the future, to be successful, Puerto Rican (Latino or
minority) candidates should exhibit a moderate, conciliatory
leadership style that is also principled. They must be firm
enough to win respect and flexible enough to avoid acrimony

by an extremist, he can talk himself blue in the face dissociating
himself from the endorser and the damage will still be
irrevocable. Moreover, if rejecting an unpopular supporter
means alienating an in- or out-group member, the risk of
losing support from the in-group at-large is much greater.
Sharpton’s support created such a dilemma for Ferrer and
his campaign did not address it properly. When the inor out-group in question is a numerical minority of the
electorate, the consequences of alienating its members are
not dire. But even in that case, the dilemma is real and
significant, especially if it is not entirely clear whether the
polarizing figure is such because of unpopular but legitimate
views or because of racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice.
A variant of this challenge is the problem of in-group division
and/or lack of support from akin out-groups. It is not reasonable
to expect unanimous support for any given individual, but

and stalemate. In 1997, Ferrer behaved accordingly and Al

Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) candidates must aspire to

Sharpton did not. After the primary and runoff election, Ruth

maximum feasible support from co-ethnics. The easiest and

Messinger was distracted by Sharpton’s continued challenge.

often quite powerful way to dismiss a minority candidate (or

His accusations of fraud created suspicion and discord among

any candidate, for that matter) is to point out that he/she is

Democrats, especially blacks, and this contributed to

not fully supported by his/her own, e.g. Puerto Ricans not

Messinger’s loss to Giuliani. Weiner’s decision in 2005 to drop

supporting Badillo or Ferrer (and in other examples, a son not

out, whether calculated or selfless, also evidenced a moderate

supporting his father, a state not supporting a native son, a

and conciliatory disposition that was useful to Ferrer. It is easy

husband undermining his candidate wife, etc.). A group like

to know this and not know the best way to behave in specific

the MPI, and its successor the Puerto Rican Socialist Party,

situations. How do we know when to be conciliatory as
opposed to feisty? We may think we do know and still
blunder. The important thing above all is to be pragmatic
without appearing to lack conviction.
171 This is the view of José R. Sánchez in, “Puerto Rican Politics in New York: Beyond
‘Secondhand’ Theory,” in Gabriel Haslip-Viera and Sherrie L. Baver, eds. Latinos in New York (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 259-301. One does not have to believe that culture
is the only factor that affects participation to recognize that agency is still critical. A national survey of
black Americans conducted in October and November 2007 revealed that while 82 percent of respondents believed that prejudice was a reality in America, 60 percent agreed that “things are getting better
for me.” More than half were positive about the future of blacks. Without that kind of attitude it makes
no difference whether the system is open or not. See Charisse Jones, “Blacks in America Diverse and
Optimistic,” Times Union, June 27, 2008, p. A4. In the case of Latinos, some of the questions in the
2006 Latino National Survey can be considered proxies for the measurement of openness. For example, why would anyone naturalize if they felt that the political system offered no opportunities to them?
Some Latinos do it for the benefits but 48 percent do it to be able to vote or to benefit from existing
legal, political, and civil rights. See Fraga, et al. Latino National Survey (LNS), 2006…, p. 49.

would not have supported Badillo or Ferrer under any
circumstances. But for MPI leaders to call Badillo a rotten
leader in 1985 was more than just being unsupportive.
Maximum feasible support from akin out-groups is also
critical. Badillo fumed over Bella Abzug’s reversal of promise
in 1977 but this was minor compared to the entrance of Percy
Sutton in the race. Black support was critical to a Puerto
Rican mayoral candidacy then and it will be so in the
foreseeable future, just as Puerto Rican support was critical
to David Dinkins in 1989 and Mark Green in 2001; the
former had it and won, the latter didn’t and lost. Blacks
(Puerto Ricans or Latinos) do not necessarily have to be the
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predominant element within a coalition of akin out-group

re-election as Bronx Borough President, Mr. Ferrer still has

supporters, but they have to be included and the coalition

an excellent future in city politics.”174 Unfortunately, doing the

must be sufficiently broad to make a difference.

right thing in 1997 meant nothing for Ferrer’s prospects in

Instead of rejecting ideology and projecting pragmatism, it
may be more important for Puerto Rican (Latino or minority)

2001 or 2005. Once it became clear that his qualifications
were a mirage, he was done for.

candidates to avoid running against an incumbent with a good

Democratic prospects for 2009 looked better before October

record. Major campaign gaffes should not be the norm in

2008 when the New York City Council waived term-limits to

their performance. As far as projections are concerned, a

allow Mayor Bloomberg to run for a third term. Projecting

positive message emphasizing collective goods can go a

Bloomberg’s standing into the future, mayoral aspirants felt

long way in luring either the broadest aggregation of the

that the only way the mayor would be defeated in 2009 would

electorate or the broadest electoral segment necessary to win.

be if a chance development brought him ill-repute with the voters.

Candidacies based on radical normative platforms such as that

Some hoped that the public would hold onto its disapproval of

of Jerónimo Domínguez are doomed to fail. In fact, in 2001

the process whereby term-limits were suspended and punish

there was a faint echo of Domínguez’s 1981 campaign against

Bloomberg by denying him re-election. But discontent can be

the rich in Ferrer’s “other New York” slogan which, however

sustained only for so long and politics is contingent only to a

mild by comparison with Dominguez’s war cry, was perceived

certain extent. To win in the future, in addition to remembrance

as racially divisive.172 Four years later, Ferrer was unable to
allay the suspicion of many voters that his administration
would favor only the “other” New Yorkers. Thus, a serious
challenge facing Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) candidates
in the future is figuring out how to avoid the so-called
Dinkins trap. In 1993, Dinkins was unable “to appease the
city’s influential white voters and business community while
satisfying the black and Latino activists who formed his core
support.” He secured the support of 60 percent of Latino
voters but Giuliani finished the race with 70 percent of
the more mobilized white vote. Dinkins lost the business
community and therefore he lost the race.173
Anthony Weiner’s sensible decision to withdraw from the race
shortly after the September 2005 primary echoed Fernando
Ferrer’s decision to let Ruth Messinger run in 1997. This is
what the New York Times said concerning Ferrer’s exit: “If Mr.
Ferrer did the sensible thing in withdrawing, however, it
should also be said that in four months of campaigning he
showed an impressive command of city government, a feel
for its issues and a personable style. As a strong favorite for
172 Dave Saltonstall, “Ferrer’s Camp Proud of Way it Ran the Race, Latinos and blacks in coalition,”
Daily News, October 12, 2001, p. 22.
173 IPS-Inter Press Service, “United States: Republicans Boosted in Off-Year Elections,” November
3, 1993. According to one news report Giuliani won 77 percent of the white vote. See Howard
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and luck, a Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) candidate will
need to have sufficient money to get his/her message across,
an efficient campaign, a machine-like GOTV effort, and broad
support across class, race, and ethnicity. Such a campaign will
also have to be palatable to the corporate and professional
world. Whomever the future Democratic contender may be,
the worst thing the party could do is to choose a candidate at
the end of a bitter internecine fight. As far as Puerto Ricans
(Latinos or minorities) go, this account shows that they need
to match capability with feasibility to be successful. The point
is worth reiterating: Historically, when the Puerto Rican
candidate has been good the context has not been favorable
and when the context has been favorable the candidate has
been inadequate. When the party mattered the most, their
candidate was a reformer; when the party was over, their
candidate was an organization man. Running a good
candidate in a favorable context is what matching capability
and feasibility is about.
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